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Abstract
We use a simple N -player stochastic game with idiosyncratic and common noises to introduce
the concept of Master Equation originally proposed by Lions in his lectures at the Colle`ge de
France. Controlling the limit N Ñ8 of the explicit solution of the N -player game, we highlight
the stochastic nature of the limit distributions of the states of the players due to the fact that
the random environment does not average out in the limit, and we recast the Mean Field Game
(MFG) paradigm in a set of coupled Stochastic Partial Differential Equations (SPDEs). The
first one is a forward stochastic Kolmogorov equation giving the evolution of the conditional
distributions of the states of the players given the common noise. The second is a form of
stochastic Hamilton Jacobi Bellman (HJB) equation providing the solution of the optimization
problem when the flow of conditional distributions is given. Being highly coupled, the system
reads as an infinite dimensional Forward Backward Stochastic Differential Equation (FBSDE).
Uniqueness of a solution and its Markov property lead to the representation of the solution of the
backward equation (i.e. the value function of the stochastic HJB equation) as a deterministic
function of the solution of the forward Kolmogorov equation, function which is usually called
the decoupling field of the FBSDE. The (infinite dimensional) PDE satisfied by this decoupling
field is identified with the master equation. We also show that this equation can be derived for
other large populations equilibriums like those given by the optimal control of McKean-Vlasov
stochastic differential equations.
The paper is written more in the style of a review than a technical paper, and we spend
more time and energy motivating and explaining the probabilistic interpretation of the Master
Equation, than identifying the most general set of assumptions under which our claims are true.
1 Introduction
In several lectures given at the Colle`ge de France, P.L. Lions describes mean-field games by a single
equation referred to as the master equation. Roughly speaking, this equation encapsulates all the
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information about the Mean Field Game (MFG) into a single equation. The purpose of this paper
is to review its theoretical underpinnings and to derive it for general MFGs with common noise.
The master equation is a Partial Differential Equation (PDE) in time, the state controlled by
the players (typically an element of a Euclidean space, say Rd), and the probability distribution of
this state. While the usual differential calculus is used in the time domain r0, T s and in the state
space Rd, the space PpRdq of probability measures needs to be endowed with a special differential
calculus described in Lions’ lectures, and explained in the notes Cardaliaguet wrote from these
lectures, [1]. See also [2] and the appendix at the end of the paper.
Our goal is to emphasize the probabilistic nature of the master equation, as the associated
characteristics are (possibly random) paths with values in the space Rd ˆ PpRdq. Our approach is
especially enlightening for mean field games in a random environment (see Section 2 for definitions
and examples), the simplest instances occurring in the presence of random shocks common to all the
players. In that framework, the characteristics are given by the dynamics of ppXt,LpXt|W 0qqq0ďtďT ,
where pXtq0ďtďT is the equilibrium trajectory of the game, as identified by the solution of the mean
field game problem, and pLpXt|W 0qq0ďtďT which denotes its conditional marginal distributions
given the value of the common noise, describes the conditional distribution of the population at
equilibrium. Examples of mean field games with a common noise were considered in [10], [9] and
[6]. Their theory is developed in the forthcoming paper [4] in a rather general setting.
As in the analysis of standard MFG models, the main challenge is the solution of a coupled
system of a forward and a backward PDEs. However, in the random environment case, both
equations are in fact stochastic PDEs (SPDEs). The forward SPDE is a Kolmogorov equation
describing the dynamics of the conditional laws of the state given the common noise, and the
backward SPDE is a stochastic Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation describing the dynamics of the
value function. Our contention is that this couple of SPDEs should be viewed as a Forward
Backward Stochastic Differential Equation (FBSDE) in infinite dimension. For with this point of
view, if some form of Markov property holds, it is natural to expect that the backward component
can be written as a function of the forward component, this function being called the decoupling
field. In finite dimension, a simple application of Itoˆ’s formula shows that when the decoupling
field is smooth, it must satisfy a PDE. We use an infinite dimensional version of this argument
to derive the master equation. The infinite dimension version of Itoˆ’s formula needed for the
differential calculus chosen for the space of measures is taken from another forthcoming paper [7]
and is adapted to the case of a random environment in the appendix.
While the MFG approach does not ask for the solution of stochastic equations of the McKean-
Vlasov type at first, the required fixed point argument identifies the equilibrium trajectory of the
game as the de facto solution of such an equation. This suggests that the tools developed for solving
MFG problems could be reused for solving optimal control problems of McKean-Vlasov dynamics.
In the previous paper [2], we established a suitable version of the stochastic Pontryagin principle
for the control of McKean-Vlasov SDEs and highlighted the differences with the version of the
stochastic Pontryagin principle used to tackle MFG models. Here we show in a similar way that
our derivation of the master equation can be used as well for this other type of large population
equilibrium problem.
The paper is organized as follows. Mean field games in a random environment are presented in
Section 2. The problem is formulated in terms of a stochastic forward-backward system in infinite
dimension. A specific example, taken from [6], is exposed in Section 3. The master equation is
derived explicitly. In Section 4, we propose a more systematic approach approach of the master
2
equation for large population control problems in a random environment. We consider both the
MFG problem and the control of McKean-Vlasov dynamics. Another example, taken from [10], is
revisited in Section 5. We end up with the proof of the chain rule along flow of random measures
in the Appendix.
When analyzed within the probabilistic framework of the stochastic maximum principle, MFGs
with a common noise lead to the analysis of stochastic differential equations conditioned on the
knowledge of some of the driving Brownian motions. These forms of conditioned forward stochastic
dynamics are best understood in the framework of Terry Lyons’ theory of rough paths. Indeed
integrals and differentials with respect to the conditioned paths can be interpreted in the sense of
rough paths while the meaning of the others can remain in the classical Itoˆ calculus framework. We
thought this final remark was appropriate given the raison d’eˆtre of the present volume, and our
strong desire to convey our deepest appreciation to the man, and pay homage to the mathematician
as a remarkably creative scientist.
2 Mean Field Games in a Random Environment
The basic purpose of mean-field game theory is to analyze asymptotic Nash equilibriums for large
populations of individuals with mean-field interactions. This goes back to the earlier and simulta-
neous and independent works of Lasry and Lions in [12, 13, 14] and Caines, Huang and Malhame´
in [11].
Throughout the paper, we shall consider the problem when the individuals (also referred to as
particles or players) are subject to two sources of noise: an idiosyncratic noise, independent from
one particle to another, and a common one, accounting for the common environment in which the
individuals evolve. We decide to model the environment by means of a zero-mean Gaussian white
noise field W 0 “ pW 0pΛ, BqqΛ,B , parameterized by the Borel subsets Λ of a Polish space Ξ and the
Borel subsets B of r0,8q, such that
E
“
W 0pΛ, BqW 0pΛ1, B1q‰ “ ν`ΛX Λ1˘|B XB1|,
where we used the notation |B| for the Lebesgue measure of a Borel subset of r0,8q. Here ν is a
non-negative measure on Ξ, called the spatial intensity of W 0. Often we shall use the notation W 0t
for W 0p ¨ , r0, tsq, and most often, we shall simply take Ξ “ R`.
We now assume that the dynamics in Rd, with d ě 1, of the private state of player i P t1, ¨ ¨ ¨ , Nu
are given by stochastic differential equations (SDEs) of the form:
dXit “ b
`
t,Xit , µ
N
t , α
i
t
˘
dt` σ`t,Xit , µNt , αit˘dW it `
ż
Ξ
σ0
`
t,Xit , µ
N
t , α
i
t, ξ
˘
W 0pdξ, dtq, (1)
where W 1, . . . ,WN are N independent Brownian motions, independent of W 0, all of them being
defined on some filtered probability space pΩ,F “ pFtqtě0,Pq. For simplicity, we assume that
W 0,W 1, . . . ,WN are 1-dimensional (multidimensional analogs can be handled along the same lines).
The term µNt denotes the empirical distribution of the particles are time t:
µNt “
1
N
Nÿ
i“1
δXit
.
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The processes ppαitqtě0q1ďiďN are progressively-measurable processes, with values in an open subset
A of some Euclidean space. They stand for control processes. The coefficients b, σ and σ0 are defined
accordingly on r0, T s ˆRdˆPpRdqˆApˆΞq with values in Rd, in a measurable way, the set PpRdq
denoting the space of probability measures on Rd endowed with the topology of weak convergence.
The simplest example of random environment corresponds to a coefficient σ0 independent of ξ.
In this case, the random measure W 0 may as well be independent of the spatial component. In
other words, we can assume that W 0pdξ, dtq “ W 0pdtq “ dW 0t , for an extra Wiener process W 0
independent of the space location ξ and of the idiosyncratic noise terms pW iq1ďiďN , representing
an extra source of noise which is common to all the players.
If we think ofW 0pdξ, dtq as a random noise which is white in time (to provide the time derivative
of a Brownian motion) and colored in space (the spectrum of the color being given by the Fourier
transform of ν), then the motivating example we should keep in mind is a function σ0 of the form
σ0pt, x, µ, α, ξq „ σ0pt, x, µ, αqδpx ´ ξq (with Ξ “ Rd and where δ is a mollified version of the delta
function which we treat as the actual point mass at 0 for the purpose of this informal discussion).
In which case the integration with respect to the spatial part of the random measure W 0 givesż
Rd
σ0pt,Xit , µNt , αit, ξqW 0pdξ, dtq “ σ0pt,Xit , µNt qW 0pXit , dtq,
which says that, at time t, the private state of player i is subject to several sources of random
shocks: its own idiosyncratic noise W it , but also, an independent white noise shock picked up at
the very location/value of his own private state.
2.1 Asymptotics of the Empirical Distribution µNt
The rationale for the MFG approach to the search for approximate Nash equilibriums for large
games is based on several limiting arguments, including the analysis of the asymptotic behavior as
N Ñ8 of the empirical distribution µNt coupling the states dynamics of the individual players. By
the symmetry of our model and de Finetti’s law of large numbers, this limit should exist if we allow
only exchangeable strategy profiles pα1t , ¨ ¨ ¨ , αNt q. This will be the case if we restrict ourselves to
distributed strategy profiles of the form αjt “ αpt,Xjt , µNt q for some deterministic (smooth) function
pt, x, µq ÞÑ αpt, x, µq P A.
In order to understand this limit, we can use an argument from propagation of chaos theory,
as exposed in the lecture notes by Sznitman [19]. Another (though equivalent) way consists in
discussing the action of µ¯Nt on test functions for t P r0, T s, T denoting some time horizon. Fixing a
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smooth test function φ with compact support in r0, T s ˆ Rd and using Itoˆ’s formula, we compute:
dxφpt, ¨ q, 1
N
Nÿ
j“1
δ
X
j
t
y “ 1
N
Nÿ
j“1
dφpt,Xjt q
“ 1
N
Nÿ
j“1
ˆ
Btφpt,Xjt qdt`∇φpt,Xjt q ¨ dXjt `
1
2
tracet∇2φpt,Xjt qdrXj ,Xjstu
˙
“ 1
N
Nÿ
j“1
Btφpt,Xjt qdt`
1
N
Nÿ
j“1
∇φpt,Xjt q ¨ σ
`
t,X
j
t , µ
N
t , αpt,Xjt , µNt q
˘
dW
j
t
` 1
N
Nÿ
j“1
∇φpt,Xjt q ¨ b
`
t,X
j
t , µ
N
t , αpt,Xjt , µNt q
˘
dt
` 1
N
Nÿ
j“1
∇φpt,Xjt q ¨
ż
Ξ
σ0
`
t,X
j
t , µ
N
t , αpt,Xjt , µNt q, ξ
˘
W 0pdξ, dtq
` 1
2N
Nÿ
j“1
trace
"ˆ
rσσ:s`t,Xjt , µNt , αpt,Xjt , µNt q˘
`
ż
Ξ
rσ0σ0:s`t,Xjt , µNt , αpt,Xjt , µNt q, ξ˘νpdξq
˙
∇2φpt,Xjt q
*
dt
Our goal is to take the limit as N Ñ8 in this expression. Using the definition of the measures µNt
we can rewrite the above equality as:
xφpt, ¨ q, µNt y ´ xφp0, ¨ q, µN0 y
“ OpN´1{2q `
ż t
0
@Btφps, ¨ q, µNs yds`
ż t
0
@
∇φps, ¨ q ¨ b`s, ¨ , µNs , αps, ¨ , µNs q˘, µNs yds
` 1
2
ż t
0
B
trace
"ˆ
rσσ:s`s, ¨ , µNs , αps, ¨ , µNs q˘
`
ż
Ξ
rσ0σ0:s`s, ¨ , µNs , αps, ¨ , µNs q, ξ˘νpdξq
˙
∇2φpt, ¨ q
*
, µNs
F
ds
`
ż t
0
@
∇φps, ¨ q ¨
ż
Ξ
σ0
`
s, ¨ , µNs , αps, ¨ , µNs q, ξ
˘
W 0pdξ, dsq, µNs
D
,
which shows (formally) after integration by parts that, in the limit N Ñ8,
µt “ lim
NÑ8
µNt
appears as a solution of the Stochastic Partial Differential Equation (SPDE)
dµt “ ´∇ ¨
“
b
`
t, ¨ , µt, αpt, ¨ , µtq
˘
µt
‰
dt´∇ ¨
ˆż
Ξ
σ0
`
t, ¨ , µt, αpt, ¨ , µtq, ξ
˘
W 0pdξ, dtqµt
˙
` 1
2
trace
„
∇
2
ˆ“
σσ:
‰`
t, ¨ , µt, αpt, ¨ , µtq
˘` ż
Ξ
“
σ0σ0:
‰`
t, ¨ , µt, αpt, ¨ , µtq, ξ
˘
νpdξq
˙
µt

dt.
(2)
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This SPDE reads as a stochastic Kolmogorov equation. It describes the flow of marginal distribu-
tions of the solution of a conditional McKean-Vlasov equation, namely:
dXt “ b
`
t,Xt, µt, αpt,Xt, µtq
˘
dt` σ`t,Xt, µt, αpt,Xt, µtq˘dWt
`
ż
Ξ
σ0pt,Xt, µt, αpt,Xt, µtq, ξ
˘
W 0pdξ, dtq, (3)
subject to the constraint µt “ LpXt|F0t q, where F0 “ pF0t qtě0 is the filtration generated by the
spatial white noise measure W 0. Throughout the whole paper, the letter L refers to the law, so
that LpXt|F0t q denotes the conditional law of Xt given F0t . The connection between (2) and (3)
can be checked by expanding pxφpt, ¨q, µty “ EpφpXtq|F0t qq0ďtďT by means of Itoˆ’s formula.
For the sake of illustration we rewrite this SPDE in a few particular cases which we will revisit
later on:
1. If we assume that σpt, x, µ, αq ” σ is a constant, that σ0pt, x, µ, αq ” σ0pt, xq is also uncon-
trolled and that the spatial white noise is actually scalar, namely W pdξ, dtq “ dW 0t for a scalar
Wiener process W 0 independent of the Wiener processes pW iqiě1, then the stochastic differential
equations giving the dynamics of the state of the system read
dXit “ bpt,Xit , µNt , αitqdt` σdW it ` σ0pt,XitqdW 0t , i “ 1, ¨ ¨ ¨ , N (4)
and the limit µt of the empirical distributions satisfies the equation
dµt “ ´∇ ¨
“
b
`
t, ¨ , µt, αpt, ¨ , µtq
˘
µt
‰
dt´∇ ¨ `σ0pt, ¨ qdW 0t µt˘
` 1
2
trace
”
∇2
´“
σσ: ` σ0σ0:‰pt, ¨ q¯µtıdt. (5)
Writing the corresponding version (3), rough paths theory would permit to express the dynamics
of the path pXtqtě0 conditional on the values of W 0. This would be another way to express the
dynamics of the conditional marginal laws of pXtqtě0 given W 0.
2. Note that, when the ambient noise is not present (i.e. either σ0 ” 0 or W 0 ” 0), this SPDE
reduces to a deterministic PDE. It is the Kolmogorov equation giving the forward dynamics of the
distribution at time t of the nonlinear diffusion process pXtqtě0 (nonlinear in McKean’s sense).
2.2 Solution Strategy for Mean Field Games
When players are assigned a cost functional, a natural (and challenging) question is to determine
equilibriums within the population. A typical framework is to assume that the cost to player i, for
any i P t1, . . . , Nu, writes
J ipα1, . . . , αN q “ E
„ż T
0
f
`
t,Xit , µ
N
t , α
i
t
˘
dt` g`XiT , µNT ˘

,
for some functions f : r0, T s ˆ Rd ˆ PpRdq ˆ A Ñ R and g : Rd ˆ PpRdq Ñ R. Keep in mind the
fact that the cost J i depends on all the controls ppαjt q0ďtďT qjPt1,...,Nu through the flow of empirical
measures pµNt q0ďtďT .
In the search for a Nash equilibrium α, one assumes that all the players j but one keep the same
strategy profile α, and the remaining player deviates from this strategy in the hope of being better
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off. If the number of players is large (think N Ñ 8), one expects that the empirical measure µNt
will not be affected much by the deviation of one single player, and for all practical purposes, one
can assume that the empirical measure µNt is approximately equal to its limit µt. So in the case
of large symmetric games, the search for approximate Nash equilibriums could be done through
the solution of the optimization problem of one single player (typically the solution of a stochastic
control problem instead of a large game) when the empirical measure µNt is replaced by the solution
µt of the SPDE (2) appearing in this limiting regime, the ‘α’ plugged in (2) denoting the strategy
used by the players at equilibrium.
The implementation of this method can be broken down into three steps for pedagogical reasons:
(i) Given an initial distribution µ0 on R
d, fix an arbitrary measure valued adapted stochastic
process pµtq0ďtďT over the probability space of the random measure W 0. It stands for a
possible candidate for being a Nash equilibrium.
(ii) Solve the (standard) stochastic control problem (with random coefficients)
inf
pαtq0ďtďT
E
„ż T
0
fpt,Xt, µt, αtqdt` gpXT , µT q

(6)
subject to
dXt “ b
`
t,Xt, µt, αt
˘
dt` σ`t,Xt, µt, αt˘dWt `
ż
Ξ
σ0
`
t,Xt, µt, αt, ξ
˘
W 0pdξ, dtq,
with X0 „ µ0, over controls in feedback form, Markovian in X conditional on the past of the
flow of random measures pµtq0ďtďT .
(iii) Plug the optimal feedback function αpt, x, µtq in the SPDE (2). Then, determine the measure
valued stochastic process pµtq0ďtďT so that the solution of the SPDE (2) be precisely pµtq0ďtďT
itself.
Clearly, this last item requires the solution of a fixed point problem in an infinite dimensional space,
while the second item involves the solution of an optimization problem in a space of stochastic
processes. Thanks to the connection between the SPDE (2) and the McKean-Vlasov equation (3),
the fixed point item (iii) reduces to the search for a flow of random measures pµtq0ďtďT such that
the law of the optimally controlled process (resulting from the solution of the second item) is in
fact µt, i.e.
@t P r0, T s, µt “ LpXt|F0t q.
In the absence of the ambient random field noise termW 0, the measure valued adapted stochas-
tic process pµtq0ďtďT can be taken as a deterministic function r0, T s Q t ÞÑ µt P PpRdq and the
control problem in item (ii) is a standard Markovian control problem. Moreover, the fixed point
item (iii) reduces to the search for a deterministic flow of measures r0, T s Q t ÞÑ µt P PpRdq
such that the optimally controlled process (resulting from the solution of the second item) satisfies
LpXtq “ µt.
2.3 Stochastic HJB Equation
In this subsection, we study the stochastic control (ii) when the flow of random measures µ “
pµtq0ďtďT is fixed. Optimization is performed over the set A of F-progressively measurable A-
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valued processes pαtq0ďtďT satisfying
E
ż T
0
|αt|2dt ă 8.
For each pt, xq P r0, T sˆRd, we let pXt,xs qtďsďT be the solution of the stochastic differential equation
(being granted that it is well-posed)
dXs “ bps,Xs, µs, αsqds` σps,Xs, µs, αsqdWs `
ż
Ξ
σ0ps,Xs, µa, αs, ξqW 0pdξ, dsq, (7)
with Xt “ x. With this notation, we define the (conditional) cost
J
µ
t,x
`pαsqtďsďT ˘ “ E
„ ż T
t
fps,Xt,xs , µs, αsqds` gpXt,xT , µT q
ˇˇˇ
F0t

(8)
and the (conditional) value function
V µpt, xq “ ess inf
pαsqtďsďT PA
J
µ
t,x
`pαsqtďsďT ˘. (9)
We shall drop the superscript and write Xs for X
t,x
s when no confusion is possible. Under some
regularity assumptions, we can show that, for each x P Rd, pV pt, xqq0ďtďT is an F0-semi-martingale
and deduce, by identification of its Itoˆ decomposition, that it solves a form of stochastic Hamilton-
Jacobi Bellman (HJB) equation. Because of the special form of the state dynamics (7), we introduce
the (nonlocal) operator symbol
L˚
`
t, x, y, z, pz0pξqqξPΞ
˘
“ inf
αPA
„
bpt, x, µt, αq ¨ y ` 1
2
trace
`rσσ:spt, x, µt, αq ¨ z˘` fpt, x, µt, αq
` 1
2
trace
ˆż
Ξ
rσ0σ0:spt, x, µt, α, ξqdνpξqs ¨ z
˙
`
ż
Ξ
σ0
`
t, x, µt, α, ξq ¨ z0pξqdνpξq

.
(10)
Assuming that the value function is smooth enough, we can use a generalization of the dynamic
programming principle to the present set-up of conditional value functions to show that V µpt, xq
satisfies a form of stochastic HJB equation as given by a parametric family of BSDEs in the sense
that:
V µpt, xq “ gpxq `
ż T
t
L˚
`
s, x, BxV ps, xq, B2xV µps, xq, pZµps, x, ξqqξPΞ
˘
ds
`
ż T
t
Zµps, x, ξqW 0pdξ, dsq.
(11)
Noticing that W 0 enjoys the martingale representation theorem (see Chapter 1 in [17]), this result
can be seen as part of the folklore of the theory of backward SPDEs (see for example [18] or [16]).
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2.4 Towards the Master Equation
The definition of L˚ in (10) suggests that the optimal feedback in (8) could be identified as a
function αˆ of t, x, µt, V
µpt, ¨q and Zµpt, ¨, ¨q realizing the infimum appearing in the definition of
L˚. Plugging such a choice for α in the SPDE (2), we deduce that the fixed point condition in
the item (iii) of a definition of an MFG equilibrium could be reformulated in terms of an infinite
dimensional FBSDE, the forward component of which being the Kolmogorov SPDE (2) (with the
specific choice of α) and the backward component the stochastic HJB equation (11). The forward
variable would be pµtq0ďtďT and the backward one would be pV µpt, ¨qq0ďtďT . Standard FBSDE
theory suggests the existence of a decoupling field expressing the backward variable in terms of the
forward one, in other words that V µpt, xq could be written as V pt, x, µtq for some function V , or
equivalently, that V µpt, ¨q could be written as V pt, ¨, µtq. Using a special form of Itoˆ’s change of
variable formula proven in the appendix at the end of the paper, these decoupling fields are easily
shown, at least when they are smooth, to satisfy PDEs or SPDEs in the case of FBSDEs with
random coefficients. The definition of the special notion of smoothness required for this form of Itoˆ
formula is recalled in the appendix. This is our hook to Lions’s master equation. In order to make
this point transparent, we strive in the sequel, to provide a better understanding of the mapping
V : r0, T s ˆ Rd ˆ PpRdq Ñ R and of its dynamics.
3 An Explicitly Solvable Model
This section is devoted to the analysis of an explicitly solvable model. It was introduced and solved
in [6]. We reproduce the part of the solution which is relevant to the present discussion. Our
interest in this model is the fact that the finite player game can be solved explicitly and the limit
N Ñ 8 of the solution can be controlled. We shall use it as a motivation and testbed for the
introduction of the master equation of mean field games with a common noise.
3.1 Constructions of Exact Nash Equilibria for the N-Player Game
We denote by Xit the log-capitalization of a bank i P t1, ¨ ¨ ¨ , Nu at time t. We assume that each
bank controls its rate of borrowing and lending through the drift of Xit in such a way that:
dXit “
“
apmNt ´Xitq ` αit
‰
dt` σ
ˆa
1´ ρ2dW it ` ρdW 0t
˙
, (12)
where W it , i “ 0, 1, . . . , N are independent scalar Wiener processes, σ ą 0, a ě 0, and mNt denotes
the sample mean of the Xit as defined by m
N
t “ pX1t `¨ ¨ ¨`XNt q{N . So, in the notation introduced
in (1), we have
bpt, x, µ, αq “ apm´ xq ` α, with m “
ż
R
xµpdxq,
since the drift of pXitqtě0 at time t depends only upon Xit itself and the mean mNt of the empirical
distribution µNt of Xt “ pX1t , ¨ ¨ ¨ ,XNt q, and
σpt, x, µ, αq “ σ
a
1´ ρ2, and σ0pt, xq “ σρ.
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Bank i P t1, ¨ ¨ ¨ , Nu controls its rate of lending and borrowing (to a central bank) at time t by
choosing the control αit in order to minimize
J ipα1, ¨ ¨ ¨ , αN q “ E
„ ż T
0
fpt,Xit , µNt , αitqdt` gpXiT , µNT q

, (13)
where the running and terminal cost functions f and g are given by:
fpt, x, µ, αq “ 1
2
α2 ´ qαpm´ xq ` 
2
pm´ xq2,
gpx, µq “ c
2
pm´ xq2,
(14)
where, as before, m denotes the mean of the measure µ. Clearly, this is a Linear-Quadratic (LQ)
model and, thus, its solvability should be equivalent to the well-posedness of a matricial Riccati
equation. However, given the special structure of the interaction, the Ricatti equation is in fact
scalar and can be solved explicitly as we are about to demonstrate.
Given an N -tuple pαˆiq1ďiďN of functions from r0, T s ˆ R into R, we define, for each i P
t1, ¨ ¨ ¨ , Nu, the related value function V i by:
V ipt, x1, . . . , xN q “ inf
pαisqtďsďT
E
„ ż T
t
f
`
s,Xis, µ
N
s , α
i
s
˘
ds` gipXiT , µNT q
ˇˇˇ
Xt “ x

,
with the cost functions f and g given in (14), and where the dynamics of pX1s , . . . ,XNs qtďsďT
are given in (12) with Xjt “ xj for j P t1, . . . , Nu and αjs “ αˆjps,Xjs q for j ­“ i. By dynamic
programming, the N scalar functions V i must satisfy the system of HJB equations:
BtV ipt, xq ` inf
αPR
 `
apx´ xiq ` α˘BxiV ipt, xq ` 12α2 ´ qα
`
x´ xi˘(` 
2
px¯´ xiq2
`
ÿ
j ­“i
`
apx´ xjq ` αˆjpt, xjq˘BxjV jpt, xq ` σ22
Nÿ
j“1
Nÿ
k“1
`
ρ2 ` δj,kp1´ ρ2q
˘ B2xjxkV ipt, xq “ 0,
for pt, xq P r0, T s ˆ RN , where we use the notation x for the mean x “ px1 ` ¨ ¨ ¨ ` xN q{N and
with the terminal condition V ipT, xq “ pc{2qpx ´ xiq2. The infima in these HJB equations can be
computed explicitly:
inf
αPR
 `
apx´ xiq ` α˘BxiV ipt, xq ` 12α2 ´ qα
`
x´ xi˘(
“ apx´ xiqBxiV ipt, xq ´
1
2
“
q
`
x´ xi˘´ BxiV ipt, xq‰2,
the infima being attained for
α “ q`x´ xi˘´ BxiV ipt, xq.
Therefore, the Markovian strategies pαˆiq1ďiďN forms a Nash equilibrium if αˆipt, xq “ q
`
x´ xi˘ ´
BxiV ipt, xq, which suggests to solve the system of N coupled HJB equations:
BtV i `
Nÿ
j“1
“pa` qq `x´ xj˘´ BxjV j‰ BxjV i ` σ22
Nÿ
j“1
Nÿ
k“1
`
ρ2 ` δj,kp1´ ρ2q
˘ B2
xjxk
V i
` 1
2
p´ q2q `x´ xi˘2 ` 1
2
pBxiV iq2 “ 0, i “ 1, ¨ ¨ ¨ , N,
(15)
10
with the same boundary terminal condition as above. Then, the feedback functions αˆipt, xq “
qpx´ xiq ´ BxiV ipt, xq are expected to give the optimal Markovian strategies. Generally speaking,
these systems of HJB equations are usually difficult to solve. Here, because the particular forms of
the couplings and the terminal conditions, we can solve the system by inspection, checking that a
solution can be found in the form
V ipt, xq “ ηt
2
px´ xiq2 ` χt, (16)
for some deterministic scalar functions t ÞÑ ηt and t ÞÑ χt satisfying ηT “ c and χT “ 0 in order to
match the terminal conditions for the V is. Indeed, the partial derivatives BxjV i and BxjxkV i read
BxjV ipt, xq “ ηt
` 1
N
´ δi,j
˘ `
x´ xi˘ , B2
xjxk
V ipt, xq “ ηt
` 1
N
´ δi,j
˘p 1
N
´ δi,kq.
and plugging these expressions into (15), and identifying term by term, we see that the system of
HJB equations is solved if an only if$’&
’%
9ηt “ 2pa` qqηt `
`
1´ 1
N2
˘
η2t ´ p´ q2q,
9χt “ ´1
2
σ2p1´ ρ2q`1´ 1
N
˘
ηt,
(17)
with the terminal conditions ηT “ c and χT “ 0. As emphasized earlier, the Riccati equation is
scalar and can be solved explicitly. One gets:
ηt “
´p´ q2q`epδ`´δ´qpT´tq ´ 1˘ ´ c`δ`epδ`´δ´qpT´tq ´ δ´˘`
δ´epδ
`´δ´qpT´tq ´ δ`˘´ cp1´ 1{N2q `epδ`´δ´qpT´tq ´ 1˘ , (18)
provided we set:
δ˘ “ ´pa` qq ˘
?
R, with R “ pa` qq2 `
ˆ
1´ 1
N2
˙
p´ q2q ą 0. (19)
Observe that the denominator in (18) is always negative since δ` ą δ´, so that ηt is well defined
for any t ď T . The condition q2 ď  implies that ηt is positive with ηT “ c. Once ηt is computed,
one solves for χt (remember that χT “ 0) and finds:
χt “ 1
2
σ2p1´ ρ2q
´
1´ 1
N
¯ż T
t
ηs ds. (20)
For the record, we note that the optimal strategies read
αˆit “ q
`
Xt ´Xit
˘´ BxiV i “ ´q ` p1´ 1N qηt
¯`
Xt ´Xit
˘
, (21)
and the optimally controlled dynamics:
dXit “
´
a` q ` p1´ 1
N
qηt
¯`
Xt ´Xit
˘
dt` σ
´a
1´ ρ2dW it ` ρdW 0t
¯
. (22)
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3.2 The Mean Field Limit
We emphasize the dependence upon the number N of players and we now write ηNt and χ
N
t for the
solutions ηt and χt of the system (17), and V
i,N pt, xq “ pηN {2qpx´xiq2`χNt for the value function
of player i in the N player game. Clearly,
lim
NÑ8
ηNt “ η8t , and lim
NÑ8
χNt “ χ8t ,
where the functions η8t and χ
8
t solve the system:$&
%
9η8t “ 2pa` qqη8t ` pη8t q2 ´ p´ q2q,
9χ8t “ ´
1
2
σ2p1´ ρ2qη8t ,
(23)
which is solved as in the case N finite. We find
η8t “
´p´ q2q`epδ`´δ´qpT´tq ´ 1˘´ c`δ`epδ`´δ´qpT´tq ´ δ´˘`
δ´epδ
`´δ´qpT´tq ´ δ`˘´ c `epδ`´δ´qpT´tq ´ 1˘ , (24)
and
χ8t “
1
2
σ2p1´ ρ2q
ż T
t
η8s ds. (25)
Next we consider the equilibrium behavior of the players’ value functions V i,N . For the purpose
of the present discussion we notice that the value functions V i,N of all the players in the N player
game can be written as
V i,N
`
t, px1, ¨ ¨ ¨ , xN q˘ “ V Nˆt, xi, 1
N
Nÿ
j“1
δxj
˙
where the single function V N is defined as
V N pt, x, µq “ η
N
t
2
ˆ
x´
ż
R
xdµpxq
˙2
` χNt , pt, x, µq P r0, T s ˆ Rˆ P1pRq,
where P1pRdq denotes the space of integrable probability measures on Rd. Since the dependence
upon the measure is only through the mean of the measure, we shall often use the function
vN pt, x,mq “ η
N
t
2
px´mq2 ` χNt , pt, x,mq P r0, T s ˆ Rˆ R,
Notice that, at least for pt, x,mq fixed, we have
lim
NÑ8
vN pt, x,mq “ v8pt, x,mq
where
v8pt, x,mq “ η
8
t
2
px´mq2 ` χ8t , pt, x,mq P r0, T s ˆ Rˆ R.
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Similarly, all the optimal strategies in (21) may be expressed through a single feedback function
αˆN pt, x,mq “ rq ` p1´ 1{NqηNt spm´ xq as αˆit “ αˆN pt,Xit ,mNt q. Clearly,
lim
NÑ8
αˆN pt, x,mq “ αˆ8pt, x,mq,
where αˆ8pt, x,mq “ rq ` ηtspm´ xq.
Repeating the analysis in Subsection 2.1, we find that the limit of the empirical distributions
satisfies the following version of (5):
dµt “ ´Bx
ˆ
rapmt ´ ¨ q ´ α8pt, ¨ qsµt
˙
dt` σ
2
2
B2xµtdt´ σρBxµtdW 0t , t P r0, T s, (26)
where mt “
ş
Rd
xdµtpxq, which is the Kolmogorov equation for the conditional marginal law given
W 0 of the solution of the McKean-Vlasov equation:
dX t “
“
a
`
mt ´Xtq ` α8pt,X tq
‰
dt` σ
´
ρdW 0t `
a
1´ ρ2dWt
¯
, (27)
subject to the condition mt “ ErXt|F0t s. Applying the Kolmogorov equation to the test function
φpxq “ x, we get
dmt “
ˆż
α8pt, xqdµtpxq
˙
dt` σρdW 0t . (28)
We now write the stochastic HJB equation (11) in the present context. Remember that we
assume that the stochastic flow pµtq0ďtďT is given (as the solution of (26) with some prescribed
initial condition µ0 “ µ), and hence so is pmtq0ďtďT . Here
L˚pt, x, y, z, z0q “ inf
αPA
„
rapmt ´ xq ` αsy ` σ
2
2
z ` σρz0 ` α
2
2
´ qαpmt ´ xq ` 
2
pmt ´ xq2

.
Since the quantity to minimize is quadratic in α, we need to compute it for α¯ “ α¯pt, x,mt, yq with
α¯pt, x,m, yq “ qpm´ xq ´ y. We get:
L˚pt, x, y, z, z0q “ pa` qqpmt ´ xqy ´ 1
2
y2 ` σ
2
2
z ` σρz0 ` 1
2
p´ q2qpmt ´ xq2.
Accordingly, the stochastic HJB equation takes the form
dtV
µpt, xq “
„
´ pa` qqpmt ´ xqBxV µpt, xq ` 1
2
rBxV µpt, xqs2 ´ σ
2
2
B2xV µpt, xq
´ σρBxZµpt, xq ´ 1
2
p´ q2qpmt ´ xq2

dt´ Zµpt, xqdW 0t , (29)
with the boundary condition V µt pxq “ pc{2qpmT ´ xq2.
3.3 Search for a Master Equation
A natural candidate for solving (29) is the random field pt, xq ÞÑ v8pt, x,mtq, where as above
pmtq0ďtďT denotes the means of the solution pµtq0ďtďt of the Kolmogorov SPDE (26). This can
be checked rigorously by using the expression of v8 and by expanding pv8pt, x,mtqq0ďtďT by Itoˆ’s
13
formula (taking advantage of (28)). As suggested at the end of the previous section, this shows
that the stochastic HJB equation admits a solution V µpt, xq that can be expressed as a function of
the current value µt of the solution of the Kolmogorov SPDE, namely
V µpt, xq “ v8
ˆ
t, x,
ż
Rd
x1dµtpx1q
˙
.
The same argument shows that pXtq0ďtďT defined in (27) as a solution of a McKean-Vlasov SDE is
in fact the optimal trajectory of the control problem considered in the item (ii) of the definition of a
MFG, see (6), under the solution pµtq0ďtďT of the stochastic PDE (26). Put it differently, pµtq0ďtďT
is a solution of the MFG and the function α8 is the associated feedback control, as suggested by
the asymptotic analysis performed in the previous paragraph.
A natural question is to characterize the dynamics of the function v8 in an intrinsic way. By
definition of the value function (see (9)), we have
V µpt,X tq “ E
„ ż T
t
f
`
s,Xs, µs, αˆ
8ps,Xsq
˘
ds` g`XT , µT ˘ˇˇFt

so that
dV µpt,X tq “ ´f
`
t,X t, µt, αˆ
8pt,X tq
˘
dt` dMt, t P r0, T s,
for some pFtq0ďtďT -martingale pMtq0ďtďT . Recalling that α¯pt, x,m, yq “ qpm´xq´y, Bxv8pt, x,mq “
η8t px´mq, and αˆ8pt, x,mq “ rq ` ηtspm´ xq, we deduce that
αˆ8pt, x,mq “ α¯`t, x,m, Bxv8pt, x,mq˘,
which is the standard relationship in stochastic optimal control for expressing the optimal feedback
in terms of the minimizer α¯ of the underlying extended Hamiltonian and of the gradient of the
value function v8. We deduce that
f
`
t,Xt, µt, αˆ
8pt,X tq
˘ “ ´1
2
`
qpmt ´X tq ´ Bxv8pt,X t,mtq
˘`
qpmt ´X tq ` Bxv8pt,X t,mtq
˘
` 
2
`
mt ´Xt
˘2
,
so that
dV µpt,X tq “
´
´ 1
2
p´ q2qpmt ´Xtq2 ´ 1
2
“Bxv8pt,X t,mtq‰2¯dt` dMt. (30)
We are to compare this Itoˆ expansion with the Itoˆ expansion of pv8pt,X t,mtqq0ďtďT . Using the
short-hand notation v8t for v
8pt,X t,mtq and standard Itoˆ’s formula, we get:
dv8t “ Btv8t dt` Bxv8t dX t ` Bmv8t dmt `
σ2
2
B2xxv8t `
σ2
2
ρ2B2mmv8t ` σ2ρ2B2xmv8t
“
”
Btv8t ` Bxv8t apmt ´X tq ` Bxv8t αˆ8pt,X tq ` Bmv8t xµt, α8pt, ¨ qy
` σ
2
2
B2xv8t `
σ2
2
ρ2B2mv8t ` σ2ρ2B2xmv8t

dt
` σρrBxv8t ` Bmv8t sdW 0t ` σ
a
1´ ρ2Bxv8t dWt.
(31)
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Identifying the bounded variation terms in (30) and (31), we get:
Btv8t ` Bxv8t apmt ´X tq ` Bxv8t αˆ8pt,X tq ` Bmv8t xµt, α8pt, ¨ qy
` σ
2
2
B2xv8t `
σ2
2
ρ2B2mv8t ` σ2ρ2B2xmv8t “ ´
1
2
p´ q2qpmt ´Xtq2 ´ 1
2
“Bxv8t ‰2,
where αˆ8pt, x,mq “ qpm ´ xq ´ Bxv8pt, x,mq. Therefore, for a general smooth function V :
pt, x,mq ÞÑ V pt, x,mq, the above relationship with v8 replaced by V holds if
BtV pt, x,mq ` pa` qqpm´ xqBxV pt, x,mq ` 1
2
p´ q2qpm´ xq2 ´ 1
2
rBxV pt, x,mqs2
` σ
2
2
B2xV pt, x,mq `
σ2
2
ρ2B2mV pt, x,mq ` σ2ρ2B2xmV pt, x,mq “ 0,
(32)
for all pt, x,mq P r0, T s ˆ Rd ˆ Rd provided we haveż
BxV pt, x,mqdµpxq “ 0, 0 ď t ď T, (33)
(33) being used to get rid of the interaction between µt and α
8. Obviously, v8 satisfies (33).
(Notice that this implies that the stochastic Kolmogorov equation becomes: dmt “ ρσdW 0t .)
Equation (32) reads as the dynamics for the decoupling field permitting to express the value
function V µ as a function of the current statistical state µt of the population. We call it the master
equation of the problem.
4 The Master Equation
While we only discussed mean field games so far, it turns out that the concept of master equation
applies as well to the control of dynamics of McKean-Vlasov type whose solution also provides
approximate equilibriums for large populations of individuals interacting through mean field terms.
See [2] for a detailed analysis. We first outline a procedure common to the two problems. Next
we specialize this procedure to the two cases of interest, deriving a master equation in each case.
Finally, we highlight the differences to better understand what differentiates these two related
problems.
4.1 General Set-Up
Stated in loose terms, the problem is to minimize the quantity
E
„ ż T
0
fps,Xαs , µs, αsqds ` gpXαT , µT q

(34)
over the space of square integrable F-adapted controls pαsq0ďsďT under the constraint that
dXαs “ b
`
s,Xαs , µs, αs
˘
ds` σps,Xαs , µs, αsqdWs `
ż
Ξ
σ0ps,Xαs , µs, αs, ξqW 0pdξ, dsq. (35)
Yet the notion of what we call a minimizer must be specified. Obvious candidates for a precise
definition of the minimization problem lead to different solutions. We consider two specifications:
on the one hand, mean field games and control of McKean-Vlasov dynamics on the other.
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1. When handling mean-field games, minimization is performed along a frozen flow of measures
pµs “ µˆsq0ďsďT describing a statistical equilibrium of the population, and the stochastic process
pXˆsq0ďsďT formed by the optimal paths of the optimal control problem (34) is required to satisfy
the matching constraints µˆs “ LpXˆs|F0s q for 0 ď s ď T . This is exactly the procedure described in
Subsection 2.2.
2. Alternatively, minimization can be performed over the set of all the solutions of (35) subject
to the McKean-Vlasov constraint pµs “ µαs q0ďsďT , with µαs “ LpXαs |F0s q for 0 ď s ď T , in which
case the problem consists in minimizing the cost functional (34) over McKean-Vlasov diffusion
processes.
As discussed painstakingly in [5], the two problems have different solutions since, in mean field
games, the minimization is performed first and the fitting of the distribution of the optimal paths is
performed next, whereas in the control of McKean-Vlasov dynamics, the McKean-Vlasov constraint
is imposed first and the minimization is handled next. Still, we show here that both problems can
be reformulated in terms of master equations, and we highlight the differences between the two in
these reformulations.
The reason for handling both problems within a single approach is that in both cases, we rely on
manipulations of a value function defined over the enlarged state space RdˆP2pRdq. For technical
reasons, we restrict ourselves to measures in P2pRdq which denotes the space of square integrable
probability measures (i.e. probability measures with a finite second moment). Indeed, for each
pt, x, µq P r0, T s ˆ Rd ˆ P2pRdq, we would like to define V pt, x, µq as the expected future costs:
V pt, x, µq “ E
„ ż T
t
fps,Xαˆs , µˆs, αˆsqds ` gpXαˆT , µˆT q
ˇˇ
Xαˆt “ x

, (36)
where αˆ minimizes the quantity (34) when we add the constraint µt “ µ and compute the time
integral between t and T . In other words:
pαˆsqtďsďT “ argminαE
„ ż T
t
fps,Xαs , µs, αsqds ` gpXαT , µT q

, (37)
the rule for computing the infimum being as explained above, either from the mean field game
procedure as in 1, or from the optimization over McKean-Vlasov dynamics as explained in 2.
In both cases, the flow pµˆsqtďsďT appearing in (36) satisfies the fixed point condition pµˆs “
LpXαˆs |F0,ts qqtďsďT , which is true in both cases as pXαˆs qtďsďT is an optimal path. Here and in
the following pF0,ts qtďsďT is the filtration generated by the future increments of the common noise
W 0, in the sense that F0,ts “ σtW 0r ´W 0t : t ď r ď su. Recall that we use the notation W 0r
for tW 0pΛ, r0, rquΛ when Λ varies through the Borel subsets of Ξ. Below, the symbol ‘hat’ always
refers to optimal quantities, and pXαˆs qtďsďT is sometimes denoted by pXˆsqtďsďT .
Generally speaking, the definition of the (deterministic) function V pt, x, µq makes sense when-
ever the minimizer pαˆsqtďsďT exists and is unique. When handling mean-field games, some addi-
tional precaution is needed to guarantee the consistency of the definition. Basically, we also need
that, given the initial distribution µ at time t, there exists a unique equilibrium flow of condi-
tional probability measures pµˆsqtďsďT satisfying µˆt “ µ and µˆs “ LpXˆs|F0,ts q for all s P rt, T s,
where pXˆsqtďsďT is the optimal path of the underlying minimization problem (performed under
the fixed flow of measures pµˆsqtďsďT ). In that case, the minimizer pαˆsqtďsďT reads as the optimal
control of pXˆsqtďsďT . In the case of the optimal control of McKean-Vlasov stochastic dynamics,
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minimization is performed over the set of conditional McKean-Vlasov diffusion processes with the
prescribed initial distribution µ at time t, in other words, satisfying (35) with LpXtq “ µ and
µs “ µαs “ LpXαs |F0,ts q for all s P rt, T s. In that case, the mapping pt, µq ÞÑ
ş
Rd
V pt, x, µqdµpxq
appears as the value function of the optimal control problem:
E
“
V pt, χ, µq‰ “ inf
α
E
„ ż T
t
f
`
s,Xαs ,LpXαs |F0,ts q, αs
˘
ds` g`XαT ,LpXαT |F0,tT q˘

, (38)
subject to Xαt “ χ where χ is a random variable with distribution µ, i.e. χ „ µ.
Our goal is to characterize the function V as the solution of a partial differential equation (PDE)
on the space r0, T s ˆ Rd ˆ P2pRdq. In the framework of mean-field games, such an equation was
touted in several presentations, and called the master equation. See for example [15], [1] or [9]. We
discuss the derivation of this equation below in Subsection 4.4. Using a similar strategy, we also
derive a master equation in the case of the optimal control of McKean-Vlasov stochastic dynamics
in Subsection 4.5 below.
4.2 Dynamic Programming Principle
In order to understand better the definition (36), we consider the case in which the minimizer
pαˆsqtďsďT has a feedback form, namely αˆs reads as αˆps,Xαˆs , µˆsq for some function αˆ : r0, T s ˆRdˆ
P2pRdq Ñ R. In this case, (36) becomes
V pt, x, µq “ E
„ ż T
t
f
`
s,Xαˆs , µˆs, αˆps,Xαˆs , µˆsq
˘
ds` gpXαˆT , µˆT q
ˇˇ
Xαt “ x

, (39)
where pXαˆs qtďsďT is the solution (if well-defined) of (35) with αs replaced by αˆps,Xαˆs , µˆsq. It is
worth recalling that, in that writing, µˆs matches the conditional law LpXαˆs |F0,ts q and is forced to
start from µˆt “ µ at time t.
Following the approach used in finite dimension, a natural strategy is then to use (39) as a basis
for deriving a dynamic programming principle for V . Quite obviously, a very convenient way to
do so consists in requiring the optimal pair pXˆs “ Xαˆs , µˆsqtďsďT to be Markov in Rd ˆ P2pRdq, in
which case we get
V pt` h,Xαˆt`h, µˆt`hq
“ E
„ ż T
t`h
fps,Xαˆs , µˆs, αˆsqds` gpXαˆT , µˆT q
ˇˇ
F
0,t
t`h _ σ
 
Xαˆt , pWs ´WtqsPrt,t`hs
(
.
Here, the σ-field F0,tt`h _ σtXαˆt , pWs ´WtqsPrt,t`hsu comprises all the events observed up until time
t` h.
The rigorous proof of the Markov property for the path pXˆs “ Xαˆs , µˆsqtďsďT is left open. Intu-
itively, it sounds reasonable to expect that the Markov property holds if, for any initial distribution
µ, there exists a unique equilibrium pµˆsqtďsďT starting from µˆt “ µ at time t P r0, T s. The reason
is that, when uniqueness holds, there is no need to investigate the past of the optimal path in order
to decide of the future of the dynamics. Such an argument is somehow quite generic in probability
theory. In particular, the claim is expected to be true in both cases, whatever the meaning of what
an equilibrium is. Of course, this suggests that the following dynamic version of (36)
V pt, x, µq “ E
„ ż t`h
t
fps,Xαˆs , µˆs, αˆsqds ` V
`
t` h,Xαˆt`h, µˆt`h
˘ˇˇ
Xαˆt “ x

(40)
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must be valid. The fact that (40) should be true in both cases is the starting point for our common
analysis of the master equation. For instance, as a by-product of (40), we can derive a variational
form of the dynamic programming principle:
E
“
V pt, χ, µq‰ “ inf E„ ż t`h
t
fps,Xαs , µs, αsqds ` V pt` h,Xαt`h, µt`hq

, (41)
which must be true in both cases as well, provided the random variable χ has distribution µ, i.e.
χ „ µ, the minimization being defined as above according to the situation.
The proof of (41) is as follows. First, we observe from (39) that (41) must be valid when
t`h “ T . Then, (40) implies that the left-hand side is greater than the ride-hand side by choosing
pαˆsqtďsďT as a control. To prove the converse inequality, we choose an arbitrary control pαsqtďsďt`h
between times t and t`h. In the control of McKean-Vlasov dynamics, this means that the random
measures pµsqtďsďt`h are chosen accordingly, as they depend on pαsqtďsďt`h, so that µt`h is equal
to the conditional law of Xαt`h at time t` h. At time t` h, this permits to switch to the optimal
strategy starting from pXαt`h, µt`hq. The resulting strategy is of a greater cost than the optimal
one. By (39), this cost is exactly given by the right-hand side in (41).
In the framework of mean field games, the argument for proving that the left-hand side is less
than the right-hand side in (41) is a bit different. The point is that the flow pµsqtďsďT is fixed
and matches pµˆsqtďsďT , so that αˆps,Xαˆs , µˆsq reads as an optimal control for optimizing (34) in
the environment pµs “ µˆsqtďsďT . So in that case, V pt, x, µq is expected to match the optimal
conditional cost
V pt, x, µq “ inf E
„ ż T
t
fps,Xαs , µˆs, αsqds` gpXαT , µˆT q
ˇˇ
Xαt “ x

, (42)
where pXαs qtďsďT solves the SDE (35) with pµs “ µˆsqtďsďT therein. Going back to (41), the choice
of an arbitrary control pαsqtďsďt`h between times t and t`h doesn’t affect the value of pµsqtďsďt`h,
which remains equal to pµˆsqtďsďt`h. At time t` h, this permits to switch to the optimal strategy
starting from Xαt`h in the environment pµˆsqtďsďT . Again, the resulting strategy is of a greater cost
than the optimal one and, by (39), this cost is exactly given by the right-hand side in (41).
We emphasize that, when controlling McKean-Vlasov dynamics, (42) fails as in that case, the
flow of measures is not frozen during the minimization procedure. In particular, the fact that (42)
holds true in mean-field games only suggests that V satisfies a stronger dynamic programming
principle in that case:
V pt, x, µq “ inf E
„ ż t`h
t
fps,Xαs , µˆs, αsqds` V
`
t` h,Xαt`h, µˆt`h
˘ˇˇ
Xαt “ x

. (43)
The reason is the same as above. On the one hand, (40) implies that the left-hand side is greater
than the ride-hand side by choosing pαˆsqtďsďT as a control. On the other hand, choosing an
arbitrary control pαˆsqtďsďt`h between t and t ` h and switching to the optimal control starting
from Xαt`h in the environment pµˆsqtďsďT , the left-hand side must be less than the right-hand side.
4.3 Derivation of the Master Equation
As illustrated earlier (see also the discussion of the second example below), the derivation of the
master equation can be based on a suitable chain rule for computing the dynamics of V along paths
of the form (35). This requires V to be smooth enough in order to apply an Itoˆ like formula.
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In the example tackled in the previous section, the dependence of V upon the measure reduces
to a dependence upon the mean of the measure, and a standard version of Itoˆ’s formula could be
used. In general, the measure argument lives in infinite dimension and different tools are needed.
The approach advocated by P.L. Lions in his lectures at the Colle`ge de France suggests to lift-up
the mapping V into
V˜ : r0, T s ˆ Rd ˆ L2pΩ˜, F˜ , P˜;Rdq Q pt, x, χ˜q ÞÑ V˜ pt, x, χ˜q “ V pt, x,Lpχ˜qq,
where pΩ˜, F˜ , P˜q can be viewed as a copy of the space pΩ,F ,Pq. The resulting V˜ is defined on the
product of r0, T sˆRd and a Hilbert space, for which the standard notion of Fre´chet differentiability
can be used. Demanding V to be smooth in the measure argument is then understood as demanding
V˜ to be smooth in the Fre´chet sense. In that perspective, expanding pV ps,Xαs , µsqqtďsďT is then
the same as expanding pV˜ ps,Xαs , χ˜sqqtďsďT , where the process pχ˜sqtďsďT is an Itoˆ process with
pµsqtďsďT as flow of marginal conditional distributions (conditional on F0,t).
The fact that we require pχ˜sqtďsďT to have pµsqtďsďT as flow of marginal conditional distribu-
tions calls for some precaution in the construction of the lifting. A way to do just this consists
in writing pΩ,F ,Pq in the form pΩ0 ˆ Ω1,F0 b F1,P0 b P1q, pΩ0,F0,P0q supporting the common
noise W 0, and pΩ1,F1,P1q the idiosyncratic noise W . So an element ω P Ω can be written as
ω “ pω0, ω1q P Ω0 ˆ Ω1. Considering a copy pΩ˜1, F˜1, P˜1q of the space pΩ1,F1,P1q, it then makes
sense to consider the process pχ˜sqtďsďT as the solution of an equation of the same form of (35),
but on the space pΩ0 ˆ Ω˜1,F0 b F˜1,P0 b P˜1q, pΩ˜1, F˜1, P˜1q being endowed with a copy W˜ of W .
The realization at some ω0 P Ω0 of the conditional law of χ˜s given F0 then reads as the law of
the random variable χ˜spω0, ¨q P L2pΩ˜1, F˜1, P˜1;Rdq. Put in our framework, this makes rigorous the
identification of Lpχ˜spω0, ¨qq with µspω0q.
Generally speaking, we expect that pV˜ ps,Xαs , χ˜sq “ V˜ ps,Xαs pω0, ω1q, χ˜spω0, ¨qqqtďsďT can be ex-
panded as
dV˜
`
s,Xαs , χ˜s
˘ “ “BtV˜ ps,Xαs , χ˜sq `Aαx V˜ ps,Xαs , χ˜sq `AαµV˜ ps,Xαs , χ˜sq
`AαxµV˜ ps,Xαs , χ˜sq
‰
ds ` dMs, t ď s ď T,
(44)
with V˜ pT, x, χ˜q “ gpx,Lpχ˜qq as terminal condition, where
piq Aαx denotes the second-order differential operator associated to the process pXαs qtďsďT . It
acts on functions of the state variable x P Rd and thus on the variable x in V˜ pt, x, χ˜q in (44).
piiq Aαµ denotes some second-order differential operator associated to the process pχ˜sqtďsďT . It
acts on functions from L2pΩ˜1, F˜1, P˜1;Rdq into R and thus on the variable χ˜ in V˜ pt, x, χ˜q.
piiiq Aαxµ denotes some second-order differential operator associated to the cross effect of pXαs qtďsďT
and pχ˜sqtďsďT , as both feel the same noiseW 0. It acts on functions from RdˆL2pΩ˜1, F˜1, P˜1;Rdq
and thus on the variables px, χ˜q in V˜ pt, x, χ˜q.
pivq pMsqtďsďT is a martingale.
A proof of (44) is given in the appendix at the end of the paper. Observe that Axµ ” 0 if there is
no common noise W 0. Plugging (44) into (41) and letting h tend to 0, we then expect:
BtE
“
V˜ pt, χ, χ˜q‰` inf
α
E
“
Aαx V˜ pt, χ, χ˜q `AαµV˜ pt, χ, χ˜q `AαxµV˜ pt, χ, χ˜q ` fpt, χ, µ, αq
‰ “ 0, (45)
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where χ are χ˜ random variables defined on pΩ1,F1,P1q and pΩ˜1, F˜1, P˜1q respectively, both being
distributed according to µ. If the minimizer has a feedback form, namely if the optimization over
random variables α reduces to optimization over random variables of the form αˆpt, χ, µq, αˆ being
a function defined on r0, T s ˆ Rd ˆ P2pRdq, then the same strategy applied to (40), shows that V˜
satisfies the master equation
BtV˜ pt, x, χ˜q `Aαˆpt,x,µqx V˜ pt, χ, χ˜q `Aαˆpt,x,µ˜qµ V˜ pt, χ, χ˜q `Aαˆpt,x,µqxµ V˜ pt, χ, χ˜q
` f`t, χ, µ, αˆpt, x, µq˘ “ 0. (46)
Of course, the rule for computing the infimum in (45) depends on the framework. In the case of
the optimal control of McKean-Vlasov diffusion processes, pχ˜spω0, ω˜1qqtďsďT in (44) is chosen as a
copy, denoted by pX˜αs pω0, ω˜1qqtďsďT , of pXαs pω0, ω1qqtďsďT on the space pΩ0ˆΩ˜1,F0bF˜1,P0bP˜1q.
In that case, Aαµ depends on α explicitly. In the framework of mean field games, pχ˜spω0, ω˜1qqtďsďT
is chosen as a copy of the optimal path pXˆsqtďsďT of the optimization problem (36) under the
statistical equilibrium flow initialized at µ at time t. It does not depend on α so that Aαµ does not
depend on α. Therefore, Aµ “ Aαµ has no role in the computation of the infimum.
For the sake of illustration, we specialize the form of (46) to a simpler case when (35) reduces
to
dXs “ bps,Xs, µs, αsqds ` σpXsqdWs ` σ0pXsqdW 0s .
In that case, we know from the results presented in the appendix that
Aαx ϕ˜pt, x, χ˜q “ xb
`
t, x,Lpχ˜q, α˘, Bxϕ˜pt, x, χ˜qy
` 1
2
Trace
“
σpxq`σpxq˘:B2xϕ˜pt, x, χ˜q‰` 12Trace
“
σ0pxq`σ0pxq˘:B2xϕ˜pt, x, χ˜q‰,
Aαµϕ˜pt, x, χ˜q “ b
`
t, χ˜,Lpχ˜q, β˜˘ ¨Dµϕ˜pt, x, χ˜q
` 1
2
D2µϕ˜
`
t, x, χ˜
˘“
σ0pχ˜q, σ0pχ˜q‰` 1
2
D2µϕ˜
`
t, x, χ˜
˘“
σpχ˜qG˜, σpχ˜qG˜‰,
Aαxµϕ˜pt, x, χ˜q “ x
 BxDµϕ˜`t, x, χ˜˘ ¨ σ0pχ˜q(, σ0pxqD,
(47)
where G˜ is an N p0, 1q random variable on the space pΩ˜1, F˜1, P˜1q, independent of W˜ . The notations
Dµ and D
2
µ refer to Fre´chet derivatives of smooth functions on the space L
2pΩ˜1, F˜1, P˜1;Rdq. For
a random variable ζ˜ P L2pΩ˜1, F˜1, P˜1;Rdq, the notation Dµϕ˜pt, x, χ˜q ¨ ζ˜ denotes the action of the
differential of ϕ˜pt, x, ¨q at point χ˜ along the direction ζ˜. Similarly, the notation D2µϕ˜pt, x, χ˜qrζ˜ , ζ˜s
denotes the action of the second-order differential of ϕ˜pt, x, ¨q at point χ˜ along the directions pζ˜ , ζ˜q.
We refer to the appendix for a more detailed account.
Notice that χ˜ in Aαµϕ˜pt, x, χ˜q denotes the copy of χ, χ standing for the value at time t of the
controlled diffusion process pχsqtďsďT . Specifying the value of χ according to the framework used
for performing the optimization, we derive below the precise shape of the resulting master equation.
Notice also that Aαxµϕ˜pt, x, χ˜q does not depend upon α as the coefficients σ0 and σ do not depend
on it.
4.4 The Case of Mean Field Games
In the framework of Mean-Field Games, pχ˜sqtďsďT is chosen as a copy of the optimal path pXˆsqtďsďT .
This says that, in (47), χ˜ stands for the value at time t of the optimally controlled state from the op-
timization problem (36) under the statistical equilibrium flow initialized at µ at time t. Therefore,
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the minimization in (45) reduces to
inf
α
E
“xbpt, χ, µ, αq, BxV˜ pt, χ, χ˜qy ` fpt, χ, µ, αq‰
“ inf
α
E
“xbpt, χ, µ, αq, BxV pt, χ, µqy ` fpt, χ, µ, αq‰, (48)
the equality following from the fact that BxV˜ pt, x, χ˜q is the same as BxV pt, x, µq (as the differentiation
is performed in the component x).
Assume now that there exists a measurable mapping α¯ : r0, T sˆRdˆP2pRdqˆRd Q pt, x, µq ÞÑ
α¯pt, x, µ, yq, providing the argument of the minimization:
α¯pt, x, µ, yq “ arg inf
αPRd
Hpt, x, µ, y, αq, (49)
where the reduced Hamiltonian H is defined as:
Hpt, x, µ, y, αq “ xbpt, x, µ, αq, yy ` fpt, x, µ, αq, (50)
Then, the minimizer in (48) must be α “ α¯pt, χ, µ, BxV pt, χ, µqq, showing that αˆpt, x, µq “ α¯pt, x, µ, BxV pt, x, µqq
is an optimal feedback. By (46), the master equation reads
BtV˜ pt, x, χ˜q ` inf
α
H
`
t, x, µ, BxV˜ pt, x, χ˜q, α
˘ ` `Aµ `Axµ˘V˜ pt, x, χ˜q
` 1
2
Trace
“
σpxq`σpxq˘:B2xV˜ pt, x, χ˜q‰` 12Trace
“
σ0pxq`σ0pxq˘:B2xV˜ pt, x, χ˜q‰ “ 0. (51)
By identification of the transport term, this says that the statistical equilibrium of the MFG with
µ as initial distribution must be given by the solution of the conditional McKean-Vlasov equation:
dXˆs “ b
`
s, Xˆs, µˆs, α¯
`
s, Xˆs, µˆs, BxV ps, Xˆs, µˆsq
˘` σ`Xˆs˘dWs ` σ0`Xˆs˘dW 0s , (52)
subject to the constraint µˆs “ LpXˆs|F0s q for s P rt, T s, with Xˆt „ µ. We indeed claim
Proposition 4.1. On the top of the assumption and notation introduced right above, assume that,
for all t P r0, T s, x P Rd and µ P P2pRdq
|α¯pt, x, µ, yq| ď C
„
1` |x| ` |y| `
ˆż
Rd
|x1|2dµpx1q
˙1{2
, (53)
and that the growths of the coefficients b, σ and σ0 satisfy a similar bound. Assume also that V˜ is
a (classical) solution of (51) satisfying, for all t P r0, T s, x P Rd and χ˜ P L2pΩ˜1, F˜1, P˜1;Rdq,
|BxV˜ pt, x, χ˜q| ` }DµV˜ pt, x, χ˜q}L2pΩ˜1q ď C
´
1` |x| ` E˜1“|χ˜|2‰1{2¯, (54)
and that, for any initial condition pt, µq P r0, T s ˆ P2pRdq, Equation (52) has a unique solution.
Then, the flow pLpXˆs|F0s qqtďsďT solves the mean field game with pt, µq as initial condition.
Proof. The proof consists of a verification argument. First, we notice from (53) and (54) that the
solution of (52) is square integrable in the sense that its supremum norm over r0, T s is square
integrable. Similarly, for any square integrable control α, the supremum of Xα (with Xαt „ µ) is
square integrable. The point is then to go back to (42) and to plug µˆs “ LpXˆs|F0s q in the right-hand
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side. Replacing g by V pT, ¨, ¨q and applying Itoˆ’s formula in the appendix (see Proposition 6.5),
using the growth and integrability assumptions to guarantee that the expectation of the martingale
part is zero, we deduce that the right-hand side is indeed greater than V pt, x, µq. Choosing pαs “
α¯ps, Xˆs, µˆs, BxV ps, Xˆs, µˆsqqtďsďT , equality must hold. This proves that pXˆsqtďsďT is a minimization
path of the optimization problem driven by its own flow of conditional distributions, which is
precisely the definition of an MFG equilibrium.
Remark 4.2. Proposition 4.1 says that the solution of the master equation (51) contains all the
information needed to solve the mean field game problem. In that framework, it is worth men-
tioning that the flow of conditional distributions pµˆs “ LpXˆs|F0s qqtďsďT solves the SPDE (2), with
αps, ¨, µˆsq “ α¯ps, x, µˆs, BxV ps, x, µˆsqq. Notice finally that pYs “ BxV ps, Xˆs, µˆsqqtďsďT may be rein-
terpreted as the adjoint process in the stochastic Pontryagin principle derived for mean field games
in [3] (at least when there is no common noise W 0). In that framework, it is worth mentioning
that the function pt, x, µq ÞÑ BxV pt, x, µq reads as the decoupling field of the McKean-Vlasov FBSDE
deriving from the stochastic Pontryagin principle. It plays the same role as the gradient of the value
function in standard optimal control theory. See Subsection 4.6.
4.5 The Case of the Control of McKean-Vlasov Dynamics
When handling the control of McKean-Vlasov dynamics, pχ˜sqtďsďT is chosen as a copy of pXαs qtďsďT .
This says that, in (47), α˜ reads as a copy of α so that the minimization in (45) takes the form
inf
α
E
“xbpt, χ, µ, αq, BxV˜ pt, χ, χ˜qy ` bpt, χ˜, µ, α˜q ¨DµV˜ pt, χ, χ˜q ` fpt, χ, µ, αq‰
“ inf
α
E
1
”
xbpt, χ, µ, αq, BxV pt, χ, µqy ` E˜1
“xbpt, χ˜, µ, α˜q, BµV pt, χ, µqpχ˜qy‰` fpt, χ, µ, αqı,
where the function BµV pt, x, µqp¨q represents the Fre´chet derivativeDµV˜ pt, x, χ˜q, that isDµV˜ pt, x, χ˜q “
BµV pt, x, µqpχ˜q. See the appendix at the end of the paper for explanations. By Fubini’s theorem,
the minimization can be reformulated as
inf
α
E
1
”@
bpt, χ, µ, αq, BxV pt, χ, µq ` E˜1
“BµV pt, χ˜, µqpχq‰D` fpt, χ, µ, αqı. (55)
The strategy is then the same as in the previous paragraph. Assume indeed that there exists a
measurable mapping α¯ : r0, T sˆRdˆP2pRdqˆRd Q pt, x, µq ÞÑ α¯pt, x, µ, yq minimizing the reduced
Hamiltonian as in (49), then the minimizer in (55) must be
αˆ “ α¯`t, χ, µ, BxV pt, χ, µq ` E˜1rBµV pt, χ˜, µqpχqs˘
“ α¯
ˆ
t, χ, µ, BxV pt, χ, µq `
ż
Rd
BµV pt, x1, µqpχqdµpx1q
˙
,
showing that αˆpt, x, µq “ α¯pt, x, µ, BxV pt, x, µq `
ş
Rd
BµV pt, x1, µqpxqdµpx1qq is an optimal feedback.
By (46), this permits to make explicit the form of the master equation. Notice that the term in αˆ
in (46) does not read as an infimum, namely:
xb`t, x, µ, αˆpt, x, µq˘, BxV pt, x, µqy ` b`t, χ˜, µ, αˆpt, χ˜, µq˘ ¨DµV˜ pt, x, χ˜q ` f`t, x, µ, αˆpt, x, µq˘
­“ inf
α
“
bpt, x, µ, αq ¨ BxV˜ pt, x, χ˜q ` bpt, x, µ, α˜
˘ ¨DµV˜ pt, x, χ˜q ` fpt, x, µ, αq‰.
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This says that the optimal path solving the optimal control of McKean-Vlasov dynamics must be
given by:
dXˆs “ b
„
s, Xˆs, µˆs, α¯
ˆ
s, Xˆs, µˆs, BxV ps, Xˆs, µˆsq `
ż
Rd
BµV ps, x1, µˆsqpXˆsqdµˆspx1q
˙
dt
` σ`Xˆs˘dWs ` σ0`Xˆs˘dW 0s ,
(56)
subject to the constraint µˆs “ LpXˆs|F0s q for s P rt, T s, with Xˆt „ µ. We indeed claim
Proposition 4.3. On the top of the assumptions and notations introduced above, assume that α¯,
b, σ and σ0 satisfy (53). Assume also V˜ is a classical solution of (46) satisfying, for all t P r0, T s,
x P Rd and χ˜ P L2pΩ˜1, F˜1, P˜1;Rdq,
|BxV˜ pt, x, χ˜q| ` }DµV˜ pt, x, χ˜q}2,Ω˜1 ď C
´
1` |x| ` E˜1“|χ˜|2‰1{2¯, (57)
and that, for any initial condition pt, µq P r0, T s ˆ P2pRdq, Equation (56) has a unique solution.
Then, the flow pLpXˆs|F0s qqtďsďT solves the minimization problem (34), set over controlled McKean-
Vlasov dynamics.
Proof. The proof consists again of a verification argument. As for mean field games, we notice
from (53) and (57) that the supremum (over r0, T s) of the solution of (56) is square integrable and
that, for any (square integrable) control α, the supremum of Xα (with Xαt „ µ) is also square
integrable. The point is then to go back to (38). Replacing g by V pT, ¨, ¨q and applying Itoˆ’s
formula in the appendix (see Proposition 6.5) (taking benefit of the integrability condition (54) for
canceling the expectation of the martingale part) and using the same Fubini argument as in (55),
we deduce that the right-hand side is indeed greater than V pt, x, µq. Choosing αs “ αˆps, Xˆs, µˆsq,
with αˆpt, x, µq “ α¯pt, x, µ, BxV pt, x, µq `
ş
Rd
BµV pt, x1, µqpxqdµpx1qq, equality must hold.
Remark 4.4. The flow of conditional distributions pµˆs “ LpXˆs|F0s qqtďsďT solves an SPDE, on the
same model as (2). The formulation of that SPDE is left to the reader.
Notice finally that pBxV ps, Xˆs, µˆsq `
ş
Rd
BµV ps, x, µˆsqpXˆsqdµˆspxqqtďsďT may be reinterpreted as
the adjoint process in the stochastic Pontryagin principle derived for the control of McKean-Vlasov
dynamics in [2] (at least when there is no common noise W 0). In particular, the function pt, x, µq ÞÑ
BxV ps, x, µq `
ş
Rd
BµV ps, x, µqpxqdµpxq reads as the decoupling field of the McKean-Vlasov FBSDE
deriving from the stochastic Pontryagin principle for the control of McKean-Vlasov dynamics. It
is interesting to notice that the fact that the formula contains two different terms is a perfect
reflection of the backward propagation of the terminal condition of the FBSDE. Indeed, as seen in
[2], this terminal condition has two terms corresponding to the partial derivatives of the terminal
cost function g with respect to the state variable x and the distribution µ. See Subsection 4.6.
4.6 Viscosity Solutions
In the previous paragraph, we used the master equation within the context of a verification ar-
gument to identify optimal paths of the underlying optimal control problem, and we alluded to
the connection with purely probabilistic methods derived from the stochastic Pontryagin principle.
The stochastic Pontryagin principle works as follows: under suitable conditions, optimal paths are
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identified with the forward component of a McKean-Vlasov FBSDE. In that framework, our dis-
cussion permits to identify the gradient of the function V with the decoupling field of the FBSDE.
This FBSDE has the form:#
dXs “ bps,Xs, µs, αˆps,Xs, µs, Ysqqds ` σ0pXsqdW 0s ` σpXsqdWs,
dYs “ ´Ψ
`
s,Xs, µs, αˆps,Xs, µs, Ysq
˘
ds ` Z0sdW 0s ` ZsdWs, YT “ φpXT , µT q
(58)
for some functions pt, x, ν, αq ÞÑ Ψpt, x, ν, αq and px, µq ÞÑ φpx, µq, the McKean-Vlasov nature of
the FBSDE being due to the constraints µs “ LpXs|F0s q and νs “ LppXs, Ysq|F0s q.
In the mean field game case, the stochastic Pontryagin principle takes the form
Ψpt, x, ν, αq “ BxH
`
t, x, µ, y, α
˘
, φpx, µq “ Bxgpx, µq, (59)
where µ denotes the first marginal of ν, and
Ψpt, x, ν, αq “ BxH
`
t, x, µ, y, α
˘ ` ż
RdˆRd
`BµH`t, x1, µ, y1, α1˘pxq˘|α1“αˆpt,x1,µ,y1qνpdx1, dy1q,
φpx, µq “ Bxgpx, µq `
ż
Rd
Bµgpx1, µqpxqµpdx1q
(60)
in the case of the control of McKean-Vlasov dynamics.
One may wonder if a converse to the strategy discussed previously is possible: how could
we reconstruct a solution of the master equation from a purely probabilistic approach? Put it
differently, given the solution of the McKean-Vlasov FBSDE characterizing the optimal path via
the stochastic Pontryagin principle, is it possible to reconstruct V and to prove that it satisfies a
PDE or SPDE which we could identify to the master equation?
In the forthcoming paper [7], the authors investigate the differentiability of the flow of a McKean-
Vlasov FBSDE and manage, in some cases, to reconstruct V as a classical solution of the master
equation.
A more direct approach consists in constructing V as a viscosity solution of the master equation.
This direct approach was used in [1] for non-stochastic games. In all cases the fundamental argument
relies on a suitable form of the dynamic programming principle. This was our motivation for the
discussion in Subsection 4.2. Still we must remember that Subsection 4.2 remains mostly at the
heuristic level, and that a complete proof of the dynamic programming principle in this context
would require more work. This is where the stochastic Pontryagin principle may help. If uniqueness
of the optimal paths and of the equilibrium are known (see for instance [3] and [2]), then the
definition of V in (36) makes sense. In this case, not only do we have the explicit form the optimal
paths, but the dynamic programming principle is expected to hold.
We refrain from going into the gory details in this review paper. Instead, we take the dynamic
programming principle for granted. The question is then to derive the master equation for V in the
viscosity sense, from the three possible versions (43), (40) and (41). In the present context, since
differentiability with respect to one of the variables is done through a lifting of the functions, we
will be using the following definition of viscosity solutions.
Definition 4.5. We say that V is a super-solution (resp. sub-solution) in the sense of viscosity of
the master equation if whenever pt, x, µq P r0, T sˆRdˆP2pRdq and the function r0, T sˆRdˆP2pRdq Q
ps, y, νq ÞÑ ϕps, y, νq is continuously differentiable, once in the time variable s, and twice in the
variables y and ν, satisfies V pt, x, µq “ ϕpt, x, µq and V ps, y, νq ě ϕps, y, νq for all ps, y, νq then we
have (45) and/or (46), with V˜ replaced by ϕ˜ and “ 0 replaced by ď 0 (respectively by ě 0).
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The reason why we say and/or might look rather strange. This will be explained below, the
problem being actually more subtle than it seems at first.
Following the approach used in standard stochastic optimal control problems, the proof could
consist in applying Itoˆ’s formula to ϕ˜ps,Xαˆs , µˆsqtďsďt`h. In fact, there is no difficulty in proving
the viscosity inequality (46) by means of (40). Still, this result is rather useless as the optimizer
αˆ is expected to depend upon the gradient of V˜ and much more, as αˆ reads as α¯ applied to the
gradient of V˜ . The question is thus to decide whether it makes sense to replace the gradient of V˜
in α¯ by the gradient of ϕ˜. To answer the question, we must distinguish the two problems:
1. In the framework of mean field games, the answer is yes. The reason is that, when V is
smooth, the inequality V ě ϕ in the neighborhood of pt, x, µq implies BxV pt, x, µq “ Bxϕpt, x, µq.
This says that we expect ϕ˜ to satisfy (51) with “ 0 replaced by ď 0. Actually, this can be checked
rigorously by means of the stronger version (43) of the dynamic programming principle, following
the proof in [8].
2. Unfortunately, this is false when handling the control of McKean-Vlasov dynamics. Indeed,
the gradient of V is then understood as BxV pt, x, µq`
ş
Rd
BµV pt, x1, µqpxqdµpx1q, which is ‘non-local’
in the sense that it involves values of V pt, x1, µq for x1 far away from x. In particular, there is no way
one can replace BxV pt, x, µq`
ş
Rd
BµV pt, x1, µqpxqdµpx1q by Bxϕpt, x, µq`
ş
Rd
Bµϕpt, x1, µqpxqdµpx1q on
the single basis of the comparison of ϕ and V . This implies that, in the optimal control of McKean-
Vlasov dynamics, viscosity solutions must be discussed in the framework of (45). Obviously, this
requires adapting the notion of viscosity solution as only the function pt, µq ÞÑ ş
Rd
V pt, x, µqdµpxq
matters in the dynamic programming principle (41). Comparison is then done with test functions
of the form pt, µq ÞÑ ş
Rd
φpt, x, µqdµpxq (or simply φpt, µq). The derivation of an inequality in (45)
is then achieved by a new application of Itoˆ’s formula.
4.7 Comparison of the Two Master Equations
We repeatedly reminded the reader that the function V obtained in the case of mean field games
(whether or not there is a common noise) is not a value function in the usual sense of optimal
control. Indeed, solving a mean field game problem is finding a fixed point problem more than
solving an optimization problem. For this reason, the master equation should not read (and should
not be interpreted) as a Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation. Indeed, even though the first terms
in Equation (51) are of Hamiltonian type, the extra term Aµ (specifically the first order term in
Aµ) shows that this equation is not an HJB equation. On the other hand, the previous subsection
shows that the master equation for the control of McKean-Vlasov dynamics, which comes from
an optimization problem, can be viewed as an HJB equation when put in the form (45). In that
case, the solution reads as the value function pt, µq ÞÑ ş
Rd
V pt, x, µqdµpxq of the corresponding
optimization problem.
5 A Second Example: A Simple Growth Model
The following growth model was introduced and studied in [10]. We review its main features by
recasting it in the framework of the present discussion of the master equation of mean field games
with common noise. In fact the common noise W 0 is the only noise of the model since σ ” 0 and
the idiosyncratic noises do not appear.
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5.1 Background
As it is the case in many economic models, the problem in [10] is set for an infinite time horizon
(T “ 8) with a positive discount rate r ą 0. As we just said, σ ” 0. Moreover, the common noise
is a one dimensional Wiener process pW 0t qtě0. As before, we denote by F0 “ pF0t qtě0 its filtration.
We also assume that its volatility is linear, that is σ0pxq “ σx for some positive constant σ, and
that each player controls the drift of its state so that bpt, x, µ, αq “ α. In other words, the dynamics
of the state of player i read:
dXit “ αitdt` σXitdW 0t . (61)
We shall restrict ourselves to Markovian controls of the form αit “ αpt,Xit q for a deterministic
function pt, xq ÞÑ αpt, xq, which will be assumed non-negative and Lipschitz in the variable x.
Under these conditions, for any player, say player 1, X1t ě 0 at all times t ą 0 if X10 ě 0 and for
any two players, say players 1 and 2, the homeomorphism property of Lipschitz SDEs implies that
X1t ď X2t at all times t ą 0 if X10 ď X20 .
Note that in the particular case
αpt, xq “ γx (62)
for some γ ą 0, then
X2t “ X1t ` pX20 ´X10 qepγ´σ
2{2qt`σW 0t . (63)
We assume that k ą 0 is a fixed parameter and we introduce a special notation for the family of
scaled Pareto distributions with decay parameter k. For any real number q ě 1, we denote by µpqq
the Pareto distribution:
µpqqpdxq “ k q
k
xk`1
1rq,8qpxqdx. (64)
Notice that X „ µp1q is equivalent to qX „ µpqq. We shall use the notation µt for the conditional
distribution of the state Xt of a generic player at time t ě 0 conditioned by the knowledge of the
past up to time t as given by F0t . Under the prescription (62), we claim that, if µ0 “ µp1q, then
µt “ µpqtq where qt “ epγ´σ2{2qt`σW 0t . In other words, conditioned on the history of the common
noise, the distribution of the states of the players remains Pareto with parameter k if it started
that way, and the left-hand point of the distribution qt can be understood as a sufficient statistic
characterizing the distribution µt. This remark is an immediate consequence of formula (63) applied
to X1t “ qt, in which case q0 “ 1, and X2t “ Xt, implying that Xt “ X0qt. So if X0 „ µp1q, then
µt „ µpqtq. In particular, we have an explicit solution of the conditional Kolmogorov equation in
the case of the particular linear feedback controls.
5.2 Optimization Problem
We now introduce the cost functions and define the optimization problem. We first assume that
the problem is set for a finite horizon T . For the sake of convenience, we skip the stage of the N
player game for N finite, and discuss directly the limiting MFG problem in order to avoid dealing
with the fact that empirical measures do not have densities. The shape of the terminal cost g will
be specified later on. Using the same notation as in [10], we define the running cost function f by
fpx, µ, αq “ c x
a
rpdµ{dxqpxqsb ´
E
p
αp
rµprx,8qqsb ,
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for some positive constants a, b, c, E and p ą 1 whose economic meanings are discussed in [10].
We use the convention that the density is the density of the absolutely continuous part of the
Lebesgue’s decomposition of the measure µ, and that in the above sum, the first term is set to 0
when this density is not defined or is itself 0. The extended Hamiltonian of the system (see (49))
reads
Hpx, y, µ, αq “ αy ` c x
a
rpdµ{dxqpxqsb ´
E
p
αp
rµprx,8qqsb
and the value α¯ of α minimizing H is given by (for y ě 0):
α¯ “ α¯px, µ, yq “
ˆ
y
E
“
µprx,8qq‰b˙1{pp´1q (65)
so that:
Hpx, y, µ, α¯q “
ˆ
y
E
“
µprx,8qq‰b˙1{pp´1qy ` c xarpdµ{dxqpxqsb
´ E
p
´
py{Eqrµprx,8qqsb
¯p{pp´1q
rµprx,8qqsb
“ p´ 1
p
E´1{pp´1qyp{pp´1q
“
µprx,8qq‰b{pp´1q ` c xarpdµ{dxqpxqsb .
In the particular case of linear controls (62), using the explicit formula (64) for the density of µpqq
and the fact that
µpqqprx,8qq “ 1^ q
k
xk
,
we get
f
`
x, µpqq, α
˘ “ c xapkqk{xk`1qb1txěqu ´ Ep α
p
1^ pqkb{xkbq
“ c
kbqkb
xa`bpk`1q1txěqu ´
E
pqkb
αp
`
xkb _ qkb˘,
and
α¯px, µ, yq “
„
y
E
´ qkb
xkb
^ 1
¯1{pp´1q
, (66)
so that
Hpx, y, µpqq, α¯q “ p´ 1
p
E´1{pp´1qyp{pp´1q
´ qkb{pp´1q
xkb{pp´1q
^ 1
¯
` cx
a`pk`1qb
kbqkb
1txěqu.
5.3 Search for a Pareto Equilibrium
Assuming that the initial distribution of the values of the state is given by the Pareto distribution
µp1q, we now restrict ourselves in searching for equilibriums with Pareto distributions, which means
that the description of the equilibrium flow of measures pµˆtq0ďtďT can be reduced to the description
of the flow of corresponding Pareto parameters pqˆtq0ďtďT . Introducing the letter V for denoting the
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solution of the master equation, we know from (51) and Proposition 4.1 that the optimal feedback
control must read
αˆpt, xq “ α¯`x, µˆt, BxV pt, x, µˆtq˘ “
„BxV pt, x, µˆtq
E
´ qˆkbt
xkb
^ 1
¯1{pp´1q
.
In order to guarantee that the equilibrium flow of measures is of Pareto type, it must satisfy the
condition:
γx “
ˆBxV pt, x, µˆtq
E
qˆkbt
xkb
˙1{pp´1q
, x ě qˆt. (67)
for some γ ą 0. There is no need for checking the condition for x ă qˆt as the path driven by the
Pareto distribution is then always greater than or equal to pqˆtqtě0.
Since we focus on equilibriums of Pareto type, we compute the function V at distributions
of Pareto type only. It then makes sense to parameterize the problem and to seek for V in the
factorized form:
Vpt, x, qq “ V pt, x, µpqqq,
for some function V : pt, x, qq P r0, T s ˆ Rˆ RÑ R. Then, the relationship (67) takes the form:
γx “
ˆBxVpt, x, qq
E
qkb
xkb
˙1{pp´1q
, x ě q.
The point is then to write the equation satisfied by V, namely the equivalent of (51) but satisfied
by V instead of V . First, we observe that, in (51), σpxq ” 0. Obviously, the difficult point is to
rewrite Aµ and Axµ as differential operators acting on the variables q and px, qq respectively.
A natural solution is to redo the computations used for deriving (51) by replacing Itoˆ’s formula
for the measures pµˆtq0ďtďT by Itoˆ’s formula for pqˆtq0ďtďT , taking benefit that pqˆtq0ďtďT solves the
SDE
dqˆt “ γqˆtdt` σqˆtdWt, (68)
which is a consequence of (62) and (63). Then the term AµV˜ in (51), which reads as the Itoˆ
expansion of V along pµˆtq0ďtďT , turns into the second-order differential operator associated to the
SDE satisfied by qˆt, namely
AqVpt, x, qq “ γqBqVpt, x, qq ` 1
2
σ2q2B2qVpt, x, qq.
Similarly, the term AxµV˜ in (51), which reads as the bracket of the components in R
d and in P2pRdq
in the Itoˆ expansion, turns into the second-order differential operator associated to bracket of the
SDEs satisfied by pXtq0ďtďT in (61) and by pqˆtq0ďtďT , namely
AxqVpt, x, qq “ σ2xqB2xqVpt, x, qq.
Rewriting (51), we get
BtVpt, x, qq ` p´ 1
p
E´1{pp´1q
`BxVpt, x, qq˘p{pp´1q´ qkb{pp´1q
xkb{pp´1q
^ 1
¯
` cx
a`pk`1qb
kbqkb
1txěqu
` γqBqVpt, x, qq ` 1
2
σ2
“
x2B2xVpt, x, qq ` q2B2qVpt, x, qq ` 2xqB2xvVpt, x, qq
‰ “ 0. (69)
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Now we look for a constant B ą 0 such that
Vpt, x, qq “ Vpx, qq “ Bx
p`bk
qbk
, (70)
solves the parameterized master equation (69) on the set tx ě qu. Under the additional condition
that a` b “ p, B must be the solution of the equation
p´ 1
p
E´1{pp´1q
`
Bpp` bkq˘p{pp´1q ` c
kb
´ γBbk ` σ
2
2
Bppp´ 1q “ 0.
The condition (67) reads
γ “
´Bpp` bkq
E
¯1{pp´1q
,
so that the above equation for B becomes
pp ` bkq1{pp´1qE´1{pp´1q`p´ 1´ bk
p
˘
Bp{pp´1q ` σ
2
2
ppp´ 1qB ` c
kb
“ 0.
which always admits a solution if ppp´ 1q ă bk. The fact that (69) is satisfied for x ě q is enough
to prove thatˆ
VpXˆt, qˆtq `
ż t
0
f
`
Xˆs, µˆs, γXˆs
˘
ds
˙
0ďtďT
, with µˆs “ µpqˆsq for s P r0, T s,
is a martingale, whenever
dXˆt “ γXˆtdt` σXˆtdW 0t , t P r0, T s,
with Xˆ0 „ µqˆ0 , and pqˆtq0ďtďT also solves (68). The reason is that Xˆt ą qˆt for any t P r0, T s (equality
Xˆt “ qˆt holds along scenarios for which Xˆ0 “ qˆ0, which are of zero probability).
The martingale property is a part of the verification Proposition 4.1 for proving the optimality
of pXˆtq0ďtďT when pµˆtq0ďtďT is the flow of conditional measures, but this is not sufficient. We must
evaluate V along a pair pXt, qˆtq0ďtďT , pXtq0ďtďT denoting a general controlled process satisfying
(61). Unfortunately, things then become more difficult as Xt might not be larger than qˆt. In other
words, we are facing the fact that V satisfies the PDE (69) on the set tx ě qu only. In order to
circumvent this problem, a strategy consists in replacing V by
Vpx, qq “ Bxp
´xbk
qbk
^ 1
¯
,
for the same constant B as above. Obviously, the PDE (69) is not satisfied when x ă q, but
V defines a subsolution on the set t0 ď x ă qu, as (69) holds but with “ 0 replaced by ě 0.
Heuristically, this should show thatˆ
VpXt, qˆtq `
ż t
0
f
`
Xs, µˆs, αs
˘
ds
˙
0ďtďT
(71)
is a submartingale when pXtq0ďtďT is an arbitrary controlled process driven by the control pαtq0ďtďT .
Still, the justification requires some precaution as the function V is not C2 (which is the standard
framework to apply Itoˆ’s expansion), its first-order derivatives being discontinuous on the diagonal
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tx “ qu. The argument for justifying the Itoˆ expansion is a bit technical so that we just give a
sketchy proof of it. Basically, we can write VpXt, qˆtq “ BpXtqprϕpXt{qˆtqsbk, with ϕprq “ minp1, rq.
The key point is that pXt{qˆtq0ďtďT is always a bounded variation process, so that the expansion
of pφpXt{qˆtqq0ďtďT , for some function φ, only requires to control φ1 and not φ2. Then, we can
regularize ϕ by a sequence pϕnqně1 such that pϕnq1prq “ 0, for r ď 1´ 1{n, pϕnq1prq “ 1, for r ě 1
and pϕnq1prq P r0, 1s for r P r1´ 1{n, 1s. The fact that pϕnq1prq is uniformly bounded in n permits
to expand pBpXtqprϕnpXt{qˆtqsbkq0ďtďT and then to pass to the limit.
The submartingale property shows thatż
Rd
Vpx, qˆ0qdµqˆ0pxq ď inf
pαtq0ďtďT
„ż T
0
fpXt, qˆt, αtqdt` VpXT , qˆT q

, (72)
which, together with the martingale property along pXˆtq0ďtďT , shows that equality holds and that
the Pareto distributions pµˆtq0ďtďT form a MFG equilibrium, provided g is chosen as V. This
constraint on the choice of g can be circumvented by choosing T “ 8, as done in [10], in which
case f must be replaced by e´rtf for some discount rate r ą 0.
The analysis in the case T “ 8 can be done in the following way. In the proof of the martingale
and submartingale properties, V must replaced by e´rtV. Plugging e´rtV and e´rtf in (69) instead
of V and f , we understand that V must now satisfy (69) but with an additional ´rV in the left-
hand side. Then, we can repeat the previous argument in order to identify the value of B in
(70). Finally, if r is large enough, Ere´rTVpXˆT , qˆT qs tends to 0 as T tends to the infinity in the
martingale property (71). Similarly, if we restrict ourselves to a class of feedback controls with a
suitable growth, Ere´rTVpXT , qˆT qs tends to 0 in (72), which permits to conclude.
5.4 Control of McKean-Vlasov Equations
A similar framework could be used for considering the control of McKean-Vlasov equations. The
analog of the strategy exposed in the previous paragraph would consist in limiting the optimization
procedure to controlled processes in (61) driven by controls pαtq0ďtďT of the form pαt “ γtXtq0ďtďT
for some deterministic pγtq0ďtďT . Using an obvious extension of (63), this would force the condi-
tional marginal distributions of pXtq0ďtďT to be Pareto distributed. Exactly as above, this would
transform the problem into a finite dimensional problem. Precisely, this would transform the prob-
lem into a finite dimensional optimal control problem. In that perspective, the corresponding
master equation could be reformulated as an HJB equation in finite dimension. In comparison
with, we emphasize, once again, that the master equation (69) for the mean field game is not a
HJB equation.
6 Appendix: A Generalized Form of Itoˆ’s Formula
Our derivation of the master equation requires the use of a form of Itoˆ formula in a space of
probability measures. This subsection is devoted to the proof of such a formula.
6.1 Notion of Differentiability
In Section 4, we alluded to a specific notion of differentiability for functions of probability measures.
The choice of this notion is dictated by the fact that 1) the probability measures we are dealing
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with appear as laws of random variables; 2) in trying to differentiate functions of measures, the
infinitesimal variations which we consider are naturally expressed as infinitesimal variations in the
linear space of those random variables. The relevance of this notion of differentiability was argued
by P.L. Lions in his lectures at the Colle`ge de France [15]. The notes [1] offer a readable account, and
[2] provides several properties involving empirical measures. It is based on the lifting of functions
P2pRdq Q µ ÞÑ Hpµq into functions H˜ defined on the Hilbert space L2pΩ˜;Rdq over some probability
space pΩ˜, F˜ , P˜q by setting H˜pX˜q “ HpLpX˜qq, for X˜ P L2pΩ˜;Rdq, Ω˜ being a Polish space and P˜ an
atomless measure.
Then, a function H is said to be differentiable at µ0 P P2pRdq if there exists a random variable
X˜0 with law µ0, in other words satisfying LpX˜0q “ µ0, such that the lifted function H˜ is Fre´chet
differentiable at X˜0. Whenever this is the case, the Fre´chet derivative of H˜ at X˜0 can be viewed
as an element of L2pΩ˜;Rdq by identifying L2pΩ˜;Rdq and its dual. It turns out that its distribution
depends only upon the law µ0 and not upon the particular random variable X˜0 having distribution
µ0. See Section 6 in [1] for details. This Fre´chet derivative rDH˜spX˜0q is called the representation of
the derivative of H at µ0 along the variable X˜0. It is shown in [1] that, as a random variable, it is of
the form h˜pX˜0q for some deterministic measurable function h˜ : Rd Ñ Rd, which is uniquely defined
µ0-almost everywhere on R
d. The equivalence class of h˜ in L2pRd, µ0q being uniquely defined, it can
be denoted by BµHpµ0q (or BHpµ0q when no confusion is possible). It is then natural to call BµHpµ0q
the derivative of H at µ0 and to identify it with a function BµHpµ0qp ¨ q : Rd Q x ÞÑ BµHpµ0qpxq P Rd.
This procedure permits to express rDH˜spX˜0q as a function of any random variable X˜0 with
distribution µ0, irrespective of where this random variable is defined.
Remark 6.1. Since it is customary to identify a Hilbert space to its dual, we will identify L2pΩ˜q
with its dual, and in so doing, any derivative DH˜pX˜q will be viewed as an element of L2pΩ˜q. In this
way, the derivative in the direction Y˜ will be given by the inner product rDH˜pX˜qs ¨ Y˜ . Accordingly,
the second Frechet derivative D2H˜pX˜q which should be a linear operator from L2pΩ˜q into itself
because of the identification with its dual, will be viewed as a bilinear form on L2pΩ˜q. In particular,
we shall use the notation D2H˜pX˜qrY˜ ¨ Z˜s for `rD2H˜pX˜qspY˜ q˘ ¨ Z˜.
Remark 6.2. The following result (see [2] for a proof) gives, though under stronger regularity
assumptions on the Fre´chet derivatives, a convenient way to handle this notion of differentiation
with respect to probability distributions. If the function H˜ is Fre´chet differentiable and if its Fre´chet
derivative is uniformly Lipschitz (i.e. there exists a constant c ą 0 such that }DH˜pX˜q´DH˜pX˜ 1q} ď
c|X˜ ´ X˜ 1| for all X˜, X˜ 1 in L2pΩ˜q), then there exists a function BµH
P2pRdq ˆ Rd Q pµ, xq ÞÑ BµHpµqpxq
such as |BµHpµqpxq ´ BµHpµqpx1q| ď c|x ´ x1| for all x, x1 P Rd and µ P P2pRdq, and for every
µ P P2pRdq, BµHpµqpX˜q “ DH˜pX˜q almost su if µ “ LpX˜q.
6.2 Itoˆ’s Formula along a Flow of Conditional Measures
In the derivation of the master equation, the value function is expanded along a flow of conditional
measures. As already explained in Subsection 4.3, this requires a suitable construction of the lifting.
Throughout this section, we assume that pΩ,F ,Pq is of the form pΩ0 ˆ Ω1,F0 b F1,P0 b P1q,
pΩ0,F0,P0q supporting the common noise W 0, and pΩ1,F1,P1q the idiosyncratic noise W . So an
element ω P Ω can be written as ω “ pω0, ω1q P Ω0 ˆ Ω1, and functionals Hpµpω0qq of a random
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probability measure µpω0q P P2pRdq with ω0 P Ω0, can be lifted into H˜pX˜pω0, ¨qq “ HpLpX˜pω0, ¨qqq,
where X˜pω0, ¨q is an element of L2pΩ˜1, F˜1,P1;Rdq with µpω0q as distribution, pΩ˜1, F˜1, P˜1q being
Polish and atomless. Put it differently, the random variable X˜ is defined on pΩ˜ “ Ω0 ˆ Ω˜1, F˜ “
F0 b F˜1, P˜ “ P0 b P˜1q.
The objective is then to expand pH˜pχ˜tpω0, ¨qqq0ďtďT , where pχ˜tq0ďtďT is the copy so constructed,
of an Itoˆ process on pΩ,F ,Pq of the form:
χt “ χ0 `
ż t
0
βsds`
ż t
0
ż
Ξ
ς0s,ξW
0pdξ, dsq `
ż t
0
ςsdWs,
for t P r0, T s, assuming that the processes pβtq0ďtďT , pςtq0ďtďT and pς0t,ξq0ďtďT,ξPΞ are progressively
measurable with respect to the filtration generated by W and W 0 and square integrable, in the
sense that
E
ż T
0
ˆ
|βt|2 ` |ςt|2 `
ż
Ξ
|ς0t,ξ |2dνpξq
˙
dt ă `8. (73)
Denoting by pW˜tq0ďtďT , pβ˜tq0ďtďT , pς˜tq0ďtďT and pς˜0t,ξq0ďtďT,ξPΞ the copies of pWtq0ďtďT , pβtq0ďtďT ,
pςtq0ďtďT and pς0t,ξq0ďtďT,ξPΞ, we then have
χ˜t “ χ˜0 `
ż t
0
β˜sds`
ż t
0
ż
Ξ
ς˜0s,ξW
0pdξ, dsq `
ż t
0
ς˜sdW˜s,
for t P r0, T s. In this framework, we emphasize that it makes sense to look at H˜pχ˜tpω0, ¨qq, for
t P r0, T s, since
E
0
E˜
1
“
sup
0ďtďT
|χ˜t|2
‰ “ E0E1“ sup
0ďtďT
|χt|2
‰ ă `8,
where E0, E1 and E˜1 are the expectations associated to P0, P1 and P˜1 respectively.
In order to simplify notations, we let χˇtpω0q “ χ˜tpω0, ¨q for t P r0, T s, so that pχˇtq0ďtďT is
L2pΩ˜1, F˜1, P˜1;Rdq-valued, P0 almost surely. Similarly, we let βˇtpω0q “ β˜tpω0, ¨q, ςˇtpω0q “ ς˜tpω0, ¨q
ςˇt,ξpω0q “ ς˜t,ξpω0, ¨q, for t P r0, T s and ξ P Ξ. We then claim
Proposition 6.3. On the top of the assumption and notation introduced right above, assume that
H˜ is twice continuously Fre´chet differentiable. Then, we have P0 almost surely, for all t P r0, T s,
H˜
`
χˇt
˘ “ H˜`χˇ0˘`
ż t
0
DH˜
`
χˇs
˘ ¨ βˇsds`
ż t
0
ż
Ξ
DH˜
`
χˇs
˘ ¨ ςˇ0s,ξ W 0pdξ, dsq
` 1
2
ż t
0
ˆ
D2H˜pχ˜sq
“
ςˇsG˜, ςˇsG˜
‰` ż
Ξ
D2H˜
`
χˇs
˘“
ςˇ0s,ξ, ςˇ
0
s,ξ
‰
dνpξq
˙
ds.
(74)
where G˜ is an N p0, 1q-distributed random variable on pΩ˜1, F˜1, P˜1q, independent of pW˜tqtě0.
Remark 6.4. Following Remark 6.2 above, one can specialize Itoˆ’s formula to a situation with
smoother derivatives. See [7] for a more detailed account. Indeed, if one assumes that
1. the function H is C1 in the sense given above and its first derivative is Lipschitz;
2. for each fixed x P Rd, the function µ ÞÑ BµHpx, µq is differentiable with Lipschitz derivative,
and consequently, there exists a function
pµ, x1, xq ÞÑ B2µHpx, µqpx1q P Rdˆd
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which is Lipschitz in x1 uniformly with respect to x and µ and such that B2µHpx, µqpX˜q gives
the Fre´chet derivative of µ ÞÑ BµHpx, µq for every x P Rd as long as LpX˜q “ µ;
3. for each fixed µ P P2pRdq, the function x ÞÑ BµHpx, µq is differentiable with Lipschitz deriva-
tive, and consequently, there exists a bounded function px, µq ÞÑ BxBµHpx, µq P Rdˆd giving
the value of its derivative.
Then, the second order term appearing in Itoˆ’s formula can be expressed as the sum of two explicit
operators whose interpretations are more natural. Indeed, the second Fre´chet derivative D2H˜pX˜q
can be written as the linear operator Y˜ ÞÑ AY˜ on L2pΩ˜1, F˜1,P1;Rdq defined by
rAY˜ spω˜1q “
ż
Ω˜1
B2µH
`
X˜pω˜1q,LpX˜q˘`X˜ 1pω1q˘Y˜ pω1q dP˜1pω1q ` BxBµH`LpX˜q, X˜pω1q˘Y˜ pω1q.
The derivation of the master equation actually requires a more general result than Propo-
sition 6.3. Indeed one needs to expand pH˜pXt, χˇtqq0ďtďT for a function H˜ of px, X˜q P Rd ˆ
L2pΩ˜1, F˜1, P˜1;Rdq. As before, pχˇtq0ďtďT is understood as pχ˜tpω0, ¨qq0ďtďT . The process pXtq0ďtďT
is assumed to be another Itoˆ process, defined on the original space pΩ,F ,Pq “ pΩ0 ˆ Ω1,F0 b
F1,P0 b P1q, with dynamics of the form
Xt “ X0 `
ż t
0
bsds `
ż t
0
ż
Ξ
σ0s,ξW
0pdξ, dsq `
ż t
0
σsdWs,
for t P r0, T s, the processes pbtq0ďtďT , pσtq0ďtďT and pσ0t,ξq0ďtďT,ξPΞ being progressively-measurable
with respect to the filtration generated by W and W 0, and square integrable as in (73). Under
these conditions, the result of Proposition 6.3 can be extended to:
Proposition 6.5. On the top of the above assumptions and notations, assume that H˜ is twice
continuously Fre´chet differentiable on Rd ˆL2pΩ˜1, F˜1, P˜1;Rdq. Then, we have P almost surely, for
all t P r0, T s,
H˜
`
Xt, χˇt
˘ “ H˜`X0, χˇ0˘
`
ż t
0
´
xBxH˜
`
Xs, χˇs
˘
, bsy `DµH˜
`
χˇs
˘ ¨ βˇs¯ds`
ż t
0
xBxH˜
`
Xs, χˇs
˘
, σsydWs
`
ż t
0
ż
Ξ
´
xBxH˜
`
Xs, χˇs
˘
, σ0s,ξy `DµH˜
`
Xs, χˇs
˘ ¨ ςˇ0s,ξ¯W 0pdξ, dsq
` 1
2
ż t
0
ż
Ξ
´
trace
“B2xH˜`Xs, χˇs˘σ0s,ξpσ0s,ξq:‰`D2µH˜`Xs, χˇs˘“ςˇ0s,ξ, ςˇ0s,ξ‰¯dνpξqds
` 1
2
ż t
0
ˆ
trace
“B2xH˜`Xs, χˇs˘σspσsq:‰`D2µH˜`Xs, χˇs˘“ςˇsG˜, ςˇsG˜‰
˙
ds
`
ż t
0
ż
Ξ
@BxDµH˜`Xs, χˇs˘ ¨ ςˇ0s,ξ , σ0s,ξDdνpξqds.
where G˜ is an N p0, 1q-distributed random variable on pΩ˜1, F˜1, P˜1q, independent of pW˜tqtě0. The
partial derivatives in the infinite dimensional component are denoted with the index ‘µ’. In that
framework, the term xBxDµH˜pXs, χˇsq ¨ ςˇ0s,ξ, σ0s,ξy reads
dÿ
i“1
tBxiDµH˜pXs, χˇsq ¨ ςˇ0s,ξu
`
σ0s,ξ
˘
i
.
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6.3 Proof of Itoˆ’s Formula
We only provide the proof of Proposition 6.3 as the proof of Proposition 6.5 is similar.
By a standard continuity argument, it is sufficient to prove that Equation (74) holds for any
t P r0, T s P0-almost surely. In particular, we can choose t “ T . Moreover, by a standard approxi-
mation argument, it is sufficient to consider the case of simple processes pβtq0ďtďT , pςtq0ďtďT and
pς0t,ξq0ďtďT,ξ of the form
βt “
M´1ÿ
i“0
βi1rτi,τi`1qptq, ςt “
M´1ÿ
i“0
ςi1rτi,τi`1qptq, ς0t,ξ “
M´1ÿ
i“0
Nÿ
j“1
ς0i,j1rτi,τi`1qptq1Aj pξq,
where M,N ě 1, 0 “ τ0 ă τ1 ă ¨ ¨ ¨ ă τM “ T , pAjq1ďjďN are piecewise disjoint Borel subsets of Ξ
and pβi, ςi, ς0i,jq1ďjďN are bounded Fτi-measurable random variables.
The strategy is taken from [7] and consists in splitting H˜pχˇT q ´ H˜pχˇ0q into
H˜pχˇT q ´ H˜pχˇ0q “
K´1ÿ
k“0
`
H˜pχˇtk`1q ´ H˜pχˇtkq
˘
,
where 0 “ t0 ă ¨ ¨ ¨ ă tK “ T is a subdivision of r0, T s of step h such that, for any k P t0, . . . ,K ´
1u, there exists some i P t0, . . . ,M ´ 1u such that rtk, tk`1q Ă rτi, τi`1q. We then start with
approximating a general increment H˜pχˇtk`1q ´ H˜pχˇtkq, omitting to specify the dependence upon
ω0. By Taylor’s formula, we know that we can find some δ P r0, 1s such that
H˜pχˇtk`1q ´ H˜pχˇtkq
“ DH˜pχˇtkq ¨ pχˇtk`1 ´ χˇtkq `
1
2
D2H˜
`
χˇtk ` δpχˇtk`1 ´ χˇtkq
˘`
χˇtk`1 ´ χˇtk , χˇtk`1 ´ χˇtk
˘
“ DH˜pχˇtkq ¨ pχˇtk`1 ´ χˇtkq `
1
2
D2H˜pχˇtkq
`
χˇtk`1 ´ χˇtk , χˇtk`1 ´ χˇtk
˘
` “D2H˜`χˇtk ` δpχˇtk`1 ´ χˇtkq˘´D2H˜`χˇtk˘‰`χˇtk`1 ´ χˇtk , χˇtk`1 ´ χˇtk˘.
(75)
By Kolmogorov continuity theorem, we know that, P0 almost surely, the mapping r0, T s Q t ÞÑ χ˜t P
L2pΩ˜1, F˜1, P˜1;Rdq is continuous. Therefore, P0 almost surely, the mapping ps, t, δq ÞÑ D2H˜pχˇt `
δpχˇs´χˇtqq is continuous from r0, T s2ˆr0, 1s to the space of bounded operators from L2pΩ˜1, F˜1, P˜1;Rdq
into itself, which proves that, P0 almost surely,
lim
hŒ0
sup
s,tPr0,T s,|t´s|ďh
sup
δPr0,1s
~D2H˜`χˇt ` δpχˇt`h ´ χˇtq˘´D2H˜`χˇt˘~2,Ω˜1 “ 0,
~¨~
2,Ω˜1 denoting the operator norm on the space of bounded operators on L
2pΩ˜1, F˜1, P˜1;Rdq. Now,
ˇˇˇ
ˇ
K´1ÿ
k“0
“
D2H˜
`
χˇtk ` δpχˇtk`1 ´ χˇtkq
˘ ´D2H˜`χˇtk˘‰`χˇtk`1 ´ χˇtk , χˇtk`1 ´ χˇtk˘
ˇˇˇ
ˇ
ď sup
s,tPr0,T s,|t´s|ďh
sup
δPr0,1s
~D2H˜`χˇt ` δpχˇs ´ χˇtq˘´D2H˜`χˇt˘~2,Ω˜1
K´1ÿ
k“0
}χˇtk`1 ´ χˇtk}2L2pΩ˜q.
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Since
E
0
„K´1ÿ
k“0
}χˇtk`1 ´ χˇtk}2L2pΩ˜q

ď C
K´1ÿ
k“0
`
tk`1 ´ tk
˘ ď CT,
we deduce thatˇˇˇ
ˇ
K´1ÿ
k“0
“
D2H˜
`
χˇtk ` δpχˇtk`1 ´ χˇtkq
˘´D2H˜`χˇtk˘‰ ¨ `χˇtk`1 ´ χˇtk , χˇtk`1 ´ χˇtk˘
ˇˇˇ
ˇÑ 0 (76)
in P0 probability as h tends to 0. We now compute the various terms appearing in (75). We write
DH˜pχˇtkq ¨ pχˇtk`1 ´ χˇtkq “ DH˜pχˇtkq ¨
ż tk`1
tk
β˜spω0, ¨qds
`DH˜pχˇtkq ¨
„ˆż tk`1
tk
ż
Ξ
ς˜0s,ξW
0pdξ, dsq
˙
pω0, ¨q

`DH˜pχˇtkq ¨
„ˆż tk`1
tk
ς˜sdW˜s
˙
pω0, ¨q.
Assume that, for some 0 ď i ďM ´ 1, τi ď tk ă tk`1 ď τi`1. Then,
DH˜pχˇtkq ¨
ż tk`1
tk
β˜spω0, ¨qds “
`
tk`1 ´ tk
˘
DH˜pχˇtkq ¨ β˜tkpω0, ¨q. (77)
Note that the right-hand side is well-defined as βtk is bounded. Similarly, we notice that
DH˜pχˇtkq ¨
„ˆż tk`1
tk
ς˜sdW˜s
˙
pω0, ¨q

“ `tk`1 ´ tk˘DH˜pχˇtkq ¨ “ς˜tkpω0, ¨q`W˜tk`1 ´ W˜tk˘‰.
Now, using the specific form of DH˜, DH˜pχˇtkpω0qq “ pω˜1 ÞÑ BµHpχ˜tkpω0, ω˜1qqq appears to be a
F˜tk -measurable random variable, and as such, it is orthogonal to ς˜tkpω0, ¨qpW˜tk`1 ´ W˜tkq, which
shows that
DH˜pχˇtkq ¨
„ˆż tk`1
tk
ς˜sdW˜s
˙
pω0, ¨q

“ 0. (78)
Finally,
DH˜pχˇtkq ¨
„ˆż tk`1
tk
ż
Ξ
ς˜0s,ξW
0pdξ, dsq
˙
pω0, ¨q

“ DH˜pχˇtkq ¨
„ Nÿ
j“1
ς˜0i,jpω0, ¨qW 0
`
Aj ˆ rtk, tk`1q
˘pω0q.
Now, W 0
`
Aj ˆ rtk, tk`1q
˘pω0q behaves as a constant in the linear form above. Therefore,
DH˜pχˇtkq ¨
„ˆż tk`1
tk
ż
Ξ
ς˜0s,ξW
0pdξ, dsq
˙
pω0, ¨q

“
Nÿ
j“1
DH˜pχˇtkq ¨ ς˜0i,jpω0, ¨qW 0
`
Aj ˆ rtk, tk`1q
˘pω0q
“
„ż tk`1
tk
ż
Ξ
 
DH˜pχˇtkq ¨ ς˜0s,ξpω0, ¨q
(
W pdξ, dsq

pω0q.
(79)
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Therefore, in analogy with (76), we deduce from (77), (78) and (79) that
K´1ÿ
k“0
DH˜pχˇtkq ¨ pχˇtk`1 ´ χˇtkq Ñ
ż T
0
DH˜pX˜sq ¨ βˇsds`
ż T
0
ż
Ξ
 
DH˜pχˇsq ¨ ςˇ0s,ξ
(
W pdξ, dsq,
in P0 probability as h tends to 0.
We now reproduce this analysis for the second order derivatives. We need to compute:
Γk :“ D2H˜pχˇtkq
”
β˜tkpω0, ¨q
`
tk`1 ´ tk
˘` ς˜tkpω0, ¨q`W˜tk`1 ´ W˜tk˘
`
Nÿ
j“1
ς˜0i,jpω0, ¨qW 0
`rtk, tk`1q ˆAj˘pω0q,
β˜tk pω1, ¨q
`
tk`1 ´ tk
˘` ς˜tkpω0, ¨q`W˜tk`1 ´ W˜tk˘` Nÿ
j“1
ς˜0i,jpω0, ¨qW 0
`rtk, tk`1q ˆAj˘pω0qı.
Clearly, the drift has very low influence on the value of Γk. Precisely, for investigating the limit (in
P
0 probability) of
řK´1
k“0 Γk, we can focus on the ‘reduced’ version of Γk:
Γk :“ D2H˜pχˇtkq
”
ς˜tkpω0, ¨q
`
W˜tk`1 ´ W˜tk
˘` Nÿ
j“1
ς0i,jpω0, ¨qW 0
`rtk, tk`1q ˆAj˘pω0q,
ς˜tkpω0, ¨q
`
W˜tk`1 ´ W˜tk
˘` Nÿ
j“1
ς0i,jpω0, ¨qW 0
`rt, t` hs ˆAj˘pω0qı.
We first notice that
D2H˜pχˇtkq
“
ς˜tkpω0, ¨q
`
W˜tk`1 ´ W˜tk
˘
, ς˜0i,jpω0, ¨qW 0
`rtk, tk`1q ˆAj˘pω0q‰ “ 0,
the reason being that
D2H˜pχˇtkq
“
ς˜tkpω0, ¨q
`
W˜tk`1 ´ W˜tk
˘
, ς˜0i,jpω0, ¨qW 0
`rtk, tk`1q ˆAj˘pω0q‰
“ lim
Ñ0
´1
“
DH˜
`
χˇtk ` ς˜0i,jpω0, ¨qW 0
`rtk, tk`1q ˆAj˘pω0q˘
´DH˜pχˇtkq
‰“
ς˜tkpω0, ¨q
`
W˜tk`1 ´ W˜tk
˘‰
,
which is zero by the independence argument used in (78). Following the proof of (79),
D2H˜pχˇtkq
” Nÿ
j“1
ς˜0i,jpω0, ¨qW 0
`rtk, tk`1q ˆAj˘pω0q, Nÿ
j“1
ς˜0i,jpω0, ¨qW 0
`rtk, tk`1q ˆAj˘pω0qı
“
Nÿ
j,j1“1
D2H˜pχˇtkq
“
ς˜0i,jpω0, ¨q, ς˜0i,j1pω0, ¨q
‰
W 0
`rtk, tk`1q ˆAj˘pω0qW 0`rtk, tk`1q ˆAj1˘pω0q.
The second line reads as a the bracket of a discrete stochastic integral. Letting ςˇ0i,jpω0q “ ς˜0i,jpω0, ¨q,
it is quite standard to check
K´1ÿ
k“0
Nÿ
j,j1“1
D2H˜pχˇtkq
“
ςˇ0i,j, ςˇ
0
i,j1
‰
W 0
`rtk, tk`1q ˆAj˘W 0`rtk, tk`1q ˆAj1˘
´
K´1ÿ
k“0
Nÿ
j“1
D2H˜pχˇtkq
“
ςˇ0i,j, ςˇ
0
i,j
‰`
tk`1 ´ tk
˘
νpAjq Ñ 0
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in P0 probability as h tends to 0. Noticing that
K´1ÿ
k“0
Nÿ
j“1
D2H˜pχˇtkq
“
ςˇ0i,j, ςˇ
0
i,j
‰`
tk`1 ´ tk
˘
νpAjq “
K´1ÿ
k“0
ż tk`1
tk
ż
Ξ
D2H˜pχˇtkq
“
ςˇ0s,ξ, ςˇ
0
s,ξ
‰
dνpξqds,
we deduce that
K´1ÿ
k“0
Nÿ
j,j1“1
D2H˜pχˇtkq
“
ςˇ0i,j, ςˇ
0
i,j1
‰
W 0
`rtk, tk`1q ˆAj˘W 0`rtk, tk`1q ˆAj1˘
´
ż T
0
ż
Ξ
D2H˜pχˇsq
“
ςˇ0s,ξ, ςˇ
0
s,ξ
‰
dνpξqdsÑ 0
in P0 probability as h tends to 0. It remains to compute
D2H˜pχˇtkq
“
ς˜tkpω0, ¨q
`
W˜tk`1 ´ W˜tk
˘
, ς˜tkpω0, ¨q
`
W˜tk`1 ´ W˜tk
˘‰
.
Recall that this is the limit
lim
εÑ0
1
ε2
“
H˜
`
χ˜tkpω0, ¨q ` ες˜tkpω0, ¨qpW˜tk`1 ´ W˜tkq
˘
` H˜`χ˜tkpω0, ¨q ´ ες˜tk pω0, ¨qpW˜tk`1 ´ W˜tkq˘´ 2H˜`χ˜tkpω0, ¨q˘‰,
which is the same as
lim
εÑ0
1
ε2
“
H˜
`
χ˜tkpω0, ¨q ` ες˜tkpω0, ¨q
a
tk`1 ´ tkG˜
˘´ H˜`χ˜tkpω0, ¨q˘‰,
where G˜ is independent of pW˜tq0ďtďT , and N p0, 1q distributed. Therefore,
D2H˜pχˇtkq
“
ςˇtk
`
W˜tk`1 ´ W˜tk
˘
, ςˇtk
`
W˜tk`1 ´ W˜tk
˘‰ “ `tk`1 ´ tk˘D2H˜pχˇtkq“ςˇtkG˜, σˇtk G˜‰,
which is enough to prove that
K´1ÿ
k“0
D2H˜pχˇtkq
“
ςˇtk
`
W˜tk`1 ´ W˜tk
˘
, ςˇtk
`
W˜tk`1 ´ W˜tk
˘‰Ñ ż T
0
D2H˜pχˇsq
“
ςˇsG˜, ςˇsG˜
‰
ds
in P0 probability as h tends to 0.
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